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Abstract
The aim of the thesis was to figure out an appropriate way to solve the Chinese heavy
sulphur dioxide pollution problem, to design an emissions trading system for China and
to try to demonstrate that the designed emissions trading system is feasible for China.
The aim of the thesis was approached by using the means of case study based research,
and focused on the environment policy — emissions trading. Emissions trading is an
economic instrument to reduce environmental pollution, and it is used all over the world.
And it is generally acknowledged to have been successful in the US Acid Rain Program.
The design of emissions trading for China is based on the theory of emissions trading and
experiences from the Acid Rain Program and Chinese emissions trading pilot project in
Taiyuan.
The study concluded that China's current command and control method should be
changed into a market-based instrument. And this change should be started in the Chinese
power industry because it is the biggest contributor of Chinese SO2 pollution and because
the control of it with the current environmental policy in China has up till now
unsuccessful.
There are many conditions that can influence the implementation of Chinese emissions
trading program, such as: Can emissions trading appropriately address the Chinese SO2
pollution problem? The situation of partner and different abatement costs; The problem
of accurate measurements; The question whether the ETS is compatible with the existing
environmental policy; Especially whether the market is free enough to implement
emissions trading in China and the problem of adequate legal authority. According to my
analysis, the emissions trading system is considered to be feasible, in spite of the fact that
the market is not totally free and in spite of the fact that the Chinese society still lacks in
legal regulation.
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Chapter I Summary
1.1 Background
The world feels China's rushing economic development, and the world is seriously
concerned with and worried about Chinese environmental pollution. With China's fast
economic growth and expanding population, China has been sacrificing its environment
to develop its economy. China is suffering more and more heavy economic, living and
social loss caused by damaged environment. With the rapid growth of the Chinese
national economy and the increasing pollution, sulfur dioxide (SO2) pollution is
considered to be one of the main environmental problems in China, due to its serious
influence on the environment, the economic and social life.
Figure 1 shows us not only a general effect of the SO2 pollution situation in China but
also how big the gap between the Chinese SO2 emission and SO2 standard of World
Health Organization (WHO) is.
Sulfur Dioxide Concentrations (ug/m3)
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Figure 1 SO2 concentrations of Chinese big cities and WHO standard
(Source: Susmita Dasgupta, et al)
The growing criticism from inside and outside China is forcing China to reduce the
pollution to an acceptable level. Meanwhile, both the developed countries and developing
countries are interested in China's program of reducing SO2 emission, because China is
the biggest developing country in the world, and its economic and social structure is at an
important changing stage. The experience of the Chinese economic reform has already
been a successful example to the third world. The experience of reducing SO2 pollution
also means a lot to the developing countries and is an interesting case to developed
countries.
The idea of designing an Emissions Trading System (ETS) for China is based on the
situation of China's SO2 pollution crises; actually, the economic, political and social
problems behind the SO2 pollution situation are inevitably to be involved and paid more
attention to through analysis.
1.2 Problem formulation
In the thesis the unbalanced development of economy and environment in China is the
background problem. What is an appropriate way to solve the accompanying problem of
heavy SO2 pollution? Can an emissions trading system help China to solve this problem?
Why and how? The questions above are the problem formulation of the thesis, and
answering these problems is the aim of the thesis.
1.3 Research objectives
In order to answer the questions above further questions should be asked.
They are:
• Why is an emissions trading system specially considered in the thesis?
This leads to some other questions: what is the existing environment protection
system? Why can't it reduce the SO2 emission successfully? And why is an emissions
trading system better than the existing one?
• Why do I look into U.S. emissions trading experience?
What is the American emissions trading program about? And how valuable is it for
China to refer to?
• How to design a suitable emissions trading system for China?
What is the key element of designing the emissions trading system? What are the
main characteristics of the Chinese economy, policy and society that should be
especially considered when the system is designed?
There are two points that I want to emphasize here. The first point is how to set the
cap and allocate the allowances. They are strongly related to China's pollution
situation and policy making, because setting the cap and allocating allowances are the
start of implementing the ETS. Inappropriate design may cause the whole plan to fail
and influence the companies' trust in the government. The second point is how to
design an ETS that is compatible with the present Pollution Levy System (PLS) in
China. The PLS is the most useful environmental protection policy in China today.
Totally replacing it by ETS is most likely to lead to low efficiency or chaos on
implementing policies. Therefore, in designing the ETS in China, great importance is
attached to make the ETS and PLS supplement each other.
• How to demonstrate that the designed ETS is feasible in China?
What are the necessary conditions to demonstrate the feasibility of the designed ETS
in China? How far has China come?
1.4 Methodology
The following methods are used to decide what kind of data should be collected and how
to analyze these data.
• Data collection
The data of the whole thesis are collected from both published literatures and from
interviews with the researchers or experts on the subject "emissions trading". The
published literatures quoted in the thesis include books, journals, newspapers and
authority websites such as American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
International Energy Agency (IEA), United National Development Program (UNDP),
and United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), etc.
To finish the research objectives and achieve the aim of the thesis, the data of China's
SO2 pollution situation, the SO2 control management and policy, the main sources of
Chinese SO2 pollution, and some successful experiences of ETS have been collected.
No face-to-face interview with researchers or experts was involved when the thesis
was written. The interviews with them have been taken from the Internet. When some
of the data are not explained clearly by the author or hard to understand, it has been
necessary to seek detailed explanation and further information. For example, China's
environmental law was revised in 2000. Little material about it can be found on the
Internet and in the library. I interviewed an expert named Hongjun Zhang who is a
lawyer of environmental law of China, and he sent me the latest material about
China's environmental law and the management of Total Emissions Control (TEC).
Another interview is with A. Denny Ellerman who is the authority of emissions
trading in US. My questions to him are about emissions allocation and the auction of
American Acid Rain Program, and his answer is very helpful for understanding US
emissions trading experiences. Although the mentioned interviews were given
through e-mail, they helped me a lot in doing the research of emissions trading in
China.
• Comparison
Comparing two or more cases may help to illustrate the elemental differences
between them and help to choose the result more easily in accordance with the
comparison. For example:
Firstly, in the chapter IV, I made a comparison between PLS and ETS. The result is,
the ETS save more cost, labour and it is more effective than the PLS in China. And
this result proves why the ETS is chosen to be the better environmental policy in the
thesis.
Secondly, when designing China's ETS, the comparison of institution, legislation and
economy between US and China is made to demonstrate what advanced experiences
from the US that can be used directly in China, and what American experiences
cannot be accepted in China and why.
• Case study
As a study method the case study is a way to provide classic and representative cases
for researching general problem in the present and the future. Normally, a case study
is a study of a record or a description of a case and the study is always focused on
how to solve the problem of the case and suggest a solution. In the thesis, two cases
about emissions trading — one from US and another from China are described and
analyzed. The writher hopes that analysing these two cases will provide important
references that can be used when the similar problems need to be coped with during
designing the ETS and considering its feasibility.
There are two case studies in the thesis. One is the American Acid Rain Program, and
the other is the Chinese emissions trading pilot project which has been implemented
in Taiyuan.
These two case studies are the basis of designing the emissions trading system in
China. Analysing them can appropriately answer the question in the problem
formulation in this chapter — Can an emissions trading system help China to achieve
reducing the SO2 emission? Why and how?
The US Acid Rain Program has been chosen because it is the most successful
instrument to reduce SO2 and NOX emissions in the US and in the world. In addition,
it is the most complete case in the thesis. Studying this case demonstrates that
emissions trading can work well in the developed country and furthermore, the case
can provide important experiences and be the foundation for designing the ETS for a
developing country like China. Although there are many differences between US and
China, especially in the economic field, the motivation of adopting ETS is the same
and the details of implementing ETS in US, especially the legislation, management,
and technology are important experiences that China needs.
Similarly, the case study of the emissions trading pilot project in Taiyuan is used to
provide experiences to design a real ETS in China, and to provide evidences to
demonstrate that the emissions trading instrument can work well in China. Through
the study of the case, it is shown that in accordance with the economic and
environmental background of the city, the general rules about emissions trading have
been established in the project. Comparing to the American Acid Rain Program that
has been successfully implemented in US — a mature market economy, the analyse
of this case points out that the ETS can also work well in some "limited" conditions,
such as the immature market economy in China.
In general, I hope that the study and analysis of these two cases may contribute to the
design of emissions trading and prove its feasibility in China.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
In Chapter II, Chinese energy consumption and air pollution situations are introduced, the
main reasons of SO2 pollution are analyzed and the serious situation of SO2 pollution in
China is shown in this chapter.
In Chapter III, the present Chinese environmental administration and policies are
described and analyzed. What are China's needs for environment protection: China's
move from concentration control to total emission control, from local to regional, from
short term to long term concern, and from command and control to market based
instruments is explained. This chapter demonstrates why the Chinese government
chooses emissions trading as a new instrument to solve the environmental problem.
In Chapter IV the American emissions trading program is studied. The experience of the
US ETS is summarized, and the comparison between it and China's PLS is drawn. On the
basis of this comparison the conclusion is reached that using the emissions trading
method to reduce SO2 pollution is better than using the existing environmental policy in
China.
In Chapter V intense attention is paid to the power sector reform in China. It covers
industry background and restructure, policy and regulation, technology and equipment,
electricity market building, end users, etc. The analysis of the Chinese power industry
shows why it has been chosen to be the first sector to test the emissions trading policy.
In Chapter VI, by understanding and thinking of all above, I make suggestions about how
to design a suitable emission trading system in The People's Republic of China.
In Chapter VII I propose my viewpoint on the emissions trading system as feasible for
China. Since the Chinese economic foundation and political support to adopt emissions
trading are weak, naturally, there are some doubtful opinions on the feasibility of
implementing emissions trading in China. This chapter demonstrates why I am confident
that China will successfully use emissions trading to reduce SO2 pollution in a future not
too away.
In Chapter VIII, the main issues of designing emissions trading in China are concluded,
and the chapter is ended with my comments.
1.6 Barriers of study
The information is always insufficient. China is a pioneer among developing countries to
use emissions trading to reduce SO2 pollution. It needs a long time to establish a new
system in China. Now China is in the very beginning of trying it. Most of the pilot
projects have not finished their tests period and there are still few lessons to be learned
from the projects. It is most difficult for me to get the new information — since I am not
working with these pilot projects. The lack of data means that the parameters of
designing the emissions trading system for China in this thesis are not very precise.
Chapter II Overview of China's energy consumption and
sulfur dioxide pollution situation
2.1. China's energy consumption and its trend
China is currently the second largest energy consumer in the world, it currently consumes
about 10 percent of the world's energy second only to the United States (about 36
quadrillion Btu in 1995 versus 88 quadrillion Btu in the United States). (Source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china/part2.html)
Coal
Coal use is over 64% of China's primary energy consumption in 2001, and China is both
the largest consumer and producer of coal in the world. China's coal consumption in
2001 was 1.38 billion short tons, or over 26% of the world total. (Source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html)
Over the longer term, Chinese coal's share of overall Chinese energy consumption is
projected to fall, but coal consumption will still increase in the future, roughly doubling
by the year 2020. (Source: World Energy Council, 18th Congress, October 2001)
Oil
China is currently the world's third largest oil consumer, after the United States and
Japan. Consumption of petroleum was 4.78 million barrels per day in 2000. (Source:
http ://www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/china.html)
Figure 2 shows us that the Chinese demand and consumption of oil is continuing to grow,
but the production of oil does not grow so much. Actually, "China has become a net oil
importer country since 1993" (Source: EIA, ibid), and "Chinese officials announced a
policy decision in February 2003 to support the creation of a strategic petroleum reserve"
(Source: EIA, ibid), so China just "produces a small amount of crude oil" (Source: EIA,
ibid) now.
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Figure 2 China oil production and consumption from 1980 to 2002 (Source: EIA, ibid)
It is predicted that China will surpass Japan as the second largest oil consumer in the
world within the next decade and reach a consumption level of 10.5 million bbl/d by
2020. (Source: EIA, ibid)
Natural Gas
Historically, natural gas has not been a major fuel in China. Until the 1990s natural gas
was used largely as a feedstock for fertilizer plants with little use for electricity
generation at that time. But now "China requires raising natural gas use from the current
level of about 25 billion cubic meters per year to 200 billion cubic meters by 2020"
(Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2000). The use of natural gas has important
environmental benefits. China has big domestic reserves of natural gas. In 2003 natural
gas accounts for more than 3% of the total energy consumption in China, (Source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html) and it is predicted that the natural gas use
will increase to 11% of China's total energy consumption in 2020. (Source: World
Energy Council, 18th Congress, October 2001)
China has embarked on a major expansion of its gas infrastructure. This "will involve
increases in domestic production and imports by pipeline and in the form of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG). Imported LNG will be used primarily in China's south-eastern
coastal region. Guangdong province has already launched a project to build six 320-
megawatt (MW) gas-fired power plants, and to convert existing oil fired plants with a
capacity of 1.8 gigawatts (GW) to LNG". (Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov) "A supply
contract has been signed for LNG from Australia's North West Shelf LNG terminal. The
project has been delayed somewhat, due to slow progress in concluding sales agreements
with end-users of the natural gas. It is likely that the commercial operation of the project
will be delayed until early 2007". (Source: ibid) "The second LNG terminal is planned
for Zhangzhou, in Fujian province farther up the coast. The third LNG import project is
under consideration for a start-up date around 2010, but it is in the preliminary stages and
has not been decided by government. If built, it would likely be located near the Yangtze
River". (Based on: http://www.eia.doe.gov)
Renewable sources
China did successful work to promote renewable energy use such as electricity from large
hydropower projects or windmills and solar heating. Renewable energy sources are
available in most areas of China, particularly for the rural development and
electrification. Although renewable sources are unlikely to substitute coal and other fossil
fuels on a large scale, there is hope that over the next 20 years the hydro energy
consumption will approach to 6.5% of China's total energy use by 2020 from 4% of
China's total energy use in 1990 (Source: World Energy Council, 18th Congress, October
2001, p5) and all the energy resources will break out of limited markets and share much
more of total energy in China.
Nuclear energy
China's nuclear energy consumption is too small to be accounted for now, but with the
development of nuclear research projects, it is predicted that the nuclear energy use will
be over 2% of China's total energy consumption in 2020. (Source: World Energy
Council, 18th Congress, October 2001, p5)
Biomass
Biomass is a big source of energy for most of China's rural area. The total amount used
of biomass is approximately equivalent to the total national oil consumption. Unlike oil,
however, biomass use has been dropping since the 1980s, as greater supplies of coal and
electricity have become available to rural residents, hi 1996 biomass energy use in rural
areas was reduced to almost half of the biomass energy consumption in 1991. (Source:
State Statistical Bureau, 1998)
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Figure 3 Energy production by fuel type Figure 4 China's energy production
(1980 - 2015) and consumption (1980 - 2015)
(Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china/part2.html)
Overall, the total energy production, the consumption situation and its prediction in China
are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 shows that coal is still the dominant
resource in China, and the demand increases very fast in next 15 years. That may be
caused by the energy demand of a fast developing economy and the undeveloped use of
clean energy. The increasing use of coal will lead to SO2 emission increasing fast. Thus
the control of the SO2 emission is and will be a long-term challenge. Oil production and
importation keep a stable development. Interestingly, the gas industry will be developed
very fast. This is caused by the Chinese government's decision to use clean energy to
achieve environmental benefits. Figure 4 shows that the energy demand and consumption
in China is increasing, the consumption curve is a bit higher than the production curve.
This means that China will import more energy in the future.
2.2 Chinese sulfur dioxide pollution situation
2.2.1 General introduction to air pollution in China
A consequence of China's rapid economic growth is the environmental pollution. Air
quality in many Chinese cities falls much below international standards. World
Development Indicators (Source: World Bank, 2001) shows that 16 of the world's 20 top
polluted cities are in China.
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2.2.1 A Status of Chinese air quality
There is no standard or simple way to measure air quality. The Chinese authorities have
developed a composite indicator — Air Pollution Index (API) — to indicate general air
quality as a function of the levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides and total suspended
particulates. The State Standards system which is also called Guo Biao (GB) is based on
the API, in which Grades I and II are considered suitable for long term living conditions,
Grade III is considered acceptable for short term living conditions, Grades IV and V are
unsuitable for humans. (Source: UNDP report 2002, chapter II)
Of the 335 Chinese cities regularly monitored, only 33 percent met either Grades I or II
in 1999, over 40 percent fell into Grades IV and V (see Figure 5). According to these
data, we can see that almost half of the Chinese cities are an unsafe air environment. If
the pollution is measured with the WHO's standard, only Haikou (Hainan province),
Sanya (Hainan province), Xiamen (Fujian province) and Beihai (Guangxi province) can
meet the WHO air quality directive.
GB 1 standard
3.9%
GB 2 standard
29.3%
GB 3 standard
26.3%
Figure 5 Air Quality in Chinese cities (Source: ibid)
Year
1995
2000
Percent
change
SO2
emissions
(lOkt)
2370
1995
-15.8
Particulate
matter
(lOkt)
1735
1165
-32.8
Industrial
dust
emissions
(lOkt)
1731
1092
-36.9
CO2
emissions
(tg)
3350
3250
-2.98
Table 1 Comparison of Emission of main air pollutants in 1995 and 2000
(Source: China Environment Yearbook)
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In addition, Table 1 presents the main air pollutions in China. They are SO2, particulate
matter, industrial dust and, not air pollution, but another serious threat for global climate
and economy — CO2 emission. SO2 emission is the most serious among these air
pollutions. Furthermore, we can see that the discharge of these pollutants was reduced. It
is achieved because the Chinese government devoted greater efforts to environmental
protection, and a lot of small, inefficient enterprises were shut down from 1995 to 2000.
Still, the air pollution in China is serious.
2.2.1.2 Sources of air pollution
Power generation and industrial energy use
Power generation and industrial energy use are now the main sources of air pollution in
China. These activities need energy consumption, especially coal consumption, and most
of the coal used in China contains high sulphur values, it causes a high SO2 pollution
level.
Transport
Since 1980, the number of vehicles has been growing annually at a rate of 20 percent in
many urban areas. It is estimated that there are currently about 20 million motor vehicles
in China, and the figure is expected to reach to 50 million by 2010. The main emissions
from transport exhausts are greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants of nitrogen oxides
(NOX) (Source: ibid)
Construction and ecological degradation
Dust from construction is widespread and poorly regulated in China, and this leads to
huge emissions in Total Suspended Particulate (TSP). Ecological destruction is another
main contributor to high levels of TSP in north of China, as sand storms have became
more frequent.
Indoor air pollution
Indoor air pollution is an always overlooked health risk that includes the effects of fuel
burning, passive smoking, cooking-oil emissions, and gases released from home
decorations. They caused the greatest problems in rural areas. A study from Xuanwei
county in Yunnan Province indicates a high correlation between indoor smoke and lung
12
cancer, where the annual lung cancer mortality rate reached over 26 per 100,000,
compared to the national average of 3.2 for women and 6.3 for men. (Source: ibid)
In general, we can see from the above figures and table, SO2, CO2, particulate matter and
dust are the main air pollution for the China, each of them having different sources,
characteristics and impacts. SO2 emission is in a big proportion of all the air pollution.
The control of air pollution especially SO2 emission has become a main task of the
Chinese government.
2.2.2 SO2 pollution situation in China
Both natural and human activities can lead to these gasses in the atmosphere. The natural
causes of gaseous emissions include volcanoes and plants. Volcanic activity releases
large amounts of both CO2 and SO2 into the atmosphere, and the release of turpenes and
isoprenes by plants is another natural source of acid chemicals. But they are only a minor
source of SO2. Human's use of fossil fuels should be the main reason of the SO2 pollution
in China today.
China is currently the largest sulphur-emitting country in the world. "The vast majority of
the sulphur is emitted through the combustion of coal." (Source: UNDP/World Bank)
China is both the largest consumer and largest producer of coal in the world (The detail
situation is presented in the beginning of this Chapter). Economic growth in China in the
last two decades has been accompanied by a doubling of coal use, driven by a fast-
growing electricity generation.
There are 500,000 sets of coal burning equipment working in China. They produce
18,000 kilo tons SO2 every year which accounts for 90% of the total emission of SO2.
(Source: The Administrative Centre for China's Agenda 21) About 70% of these burning
equipment are power plants, many of them are small, inefficient and highly polluting, and
were built hastily over the last two decades to remedy the nation's severe power shortage.
Coal burning power plants alone consumes more than 40% of the nation's total coal,
which reached approximately 1.2 billion metric tons in 1999 and is responsible one-third
of the SO2 discharged. (Source: The sino sphere journal, Volume 5, Issue 1, July 2002)
The data from the government show that total SO2 emission in China increased between
1980 and 1995 to 23.7 million tonnes. (Source: Jintian Yang and Jeremy Schreifels)
Figure 6 illustrates the annual SO2 emissions in China during the 1990s. Table 2 gives us
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more quantitative impression of the SO2 emission situation in most of Chinese provinces
from 1995 to 2000.
Emissions
(million tons)
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Figure 6 SO2 emissions in China from 1990 to 2000
(Based on: China environment yearbook, 1990 to 2002)
Both Figure 6 and Table 2 tell us that, firstly, SO2 emissions had declined each year from
1995 until the mid of 1999 (a series of SO2 emission control measures such as small,
inefficient plants were shut down by government in 1995); secondly, from the mid of
1999 SO2 emission in China has increased again; in addition, during this period (from
1995 to 2000) the SO2 emission from the Chinese power sector increased continually.
This means that the total decrease of national SO2 emission might be caused by the sharp
reduction of SO2 emission from other sectors but not from the power sector. The Chinese
power sector plays the most important role in the SO2 pollution control plan, since it is
the biggest contributor of SO2 emissions in China; at the same time, the old facilities and
inefficient management in the power sector still contribute with a huge amount of SO2. It
is a real bottleneck and it needs to be solved. These are the obvious reasons why the
thesis concentrates on the Chinese power sector to solve the SO2 pollution problem.
The reasons for the reduction of SO2 emission in a period (mid 1990s) are clear (it is
briefly mentioned above), but why the reduction cannot be maintained is an interesting
question. This question will be discussed in the next Chapter after studying the Chinese
environmental protection management and policy.
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Provinces
Anhui
Beijing
Chongqing
Fujian
Gansu
Guangdong
Guangxi
Guizhou
Hainan
Hebei
Heilongjiang
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Jiangsu
Jiangxi
Jilin
Liaoning
Ningxia
Qinghai
Shared
Shandong
Shanghai
Shanxi
Sichuan
Tianjin
Tibet
Xinjiang
Yunnan
Zhejiang
Total
1995
500.3
382.9
952.2
234.8
440.5
937.4
1024.6
1403.0
37.8
1660.0
289.6
1535.8
650.6
881.6
1390.9
633.9
255.0
1029.0
204.0
39.3
999.2
2438.0
510.6
1578.5
2156.0
336.0
1.0
354.9
447.0
613.9
24647.8
1996
458.0
361.7
952.0
335.0
434.8
770.7
844.5
900.0
29.3
1581.0
321.0
1210.0
646.2
990.0
1413.1
435.0
238.7
1102.0
233.1
29.5
994.3
2118.0
571.6
1080.0
1555.2
360.0
3.0
351.4
513.0
804.0
22425.1
1997
488.6
348.2
898.0
474.8
429.3
693.3
992.6
1764.8
20.8
1460.2
305.6
922.6
579.5
820.9
1369.8
406.3
286.6
Ll 124.3
221.8
37.3
758.4
2473.2
508.5
1820.1
1032.2
272.0
1.0
309.1
410.4
672.8
22655.8
1998
423.5
334.8
930.7
165.0
383.4
678.7
700.9
1927.9
20.4
1403.0
300.1
1002.9
568.8
722.1
1254.6
304.6
283.9
991.9
215.2
31.3
660.1
2258.9
488.9
1419.9
1407.7
229.9
1.4
335.6
360.1
645.5
21179.8
1999
409.8
284.6
941.1
190.4
312.4
694.9
583.5
1494.5
22.4
1326.2
294.1
849.7
553.5
758.4
979.7
284.3
293.7
937.4
207.9
31.0
647.8
1829.8
403.1
1239.5
812.7
242.4
0.9
337.1
336.6
636.4
18626.5
2000
462.7
360.4
947.3
204.6
444.9
853.9
809.0
1063.0
35.9
1369.1
318.1
1230.0
607.8
671.0
1221.2
518.2
252.5
970.3
254.0
53.7
893.7
1996.6
518.7
1482.7
818.1
390.4
349.2
415.4
558.7
20737.9
Table 2 SO2 Emissions in Chinese Provinces from 1995 to 2000 (thousand metric tons)
(Source: UNDP/World Bank)
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2.3 Acid rain in China
2.3.1 The definition of acid rain
Acid rain, also called acid precipitation or acid deposition, is a kind of precipitation that
contains harmful nitric acid and sulfuric acid formed primarily by nitrogen and sulfur
oxides in the atmosphere. Rain water is naturally slightly acidic, but increased levels
causes damage to crops, buildings and wildlife and is often indirectly damaging to
humans.
The natural phenomena that contribute acid-producing gases to the atmosphere are
emissions from volcanoes and from biological processes that occur on land, in wetlands,
and in the oceans. The human sources are industrial and power-generating plants and
transportation vehicles. The gases may be carried hundreds of miles in the atmosphere
before they are converted to acids and deposited.
2.3.2 Acid rain regions in China
Increasing amounts of SO2, NOX, or a lesser carbon dioxide cause the increasing acid in
rain water. In 1996 the air pollution caused by acid rain was getting serious and the
affected areas were expanded, covering 30 percent of the total territory of China.
According to the monitoring data for 84 cities, 43 of them are with an annual average PH
value of acid rain lower than 5.6, 24 of them are with acid rain frequently higher than
60%.
In China areas where mainly SO2 contributed and acid rain has mainly been distributed
are show as following map (Figure 7):
In figure 7 the red areas show the main SO2 emissions places, the green areas show the
main acid rain regions in China. We can see that SO2 emission is a kind of trans-regional
pollution. The main source of SO2 is located in the north of China, but the main acid rain
regions are in the south and east of China.
The northern boundary of acid rain regions in China is Qingdao and Tumen, where the
pH value of the acid rain is low and frequency of acid rain was relatively high. These two
areas were the ones in the north to suffer most frequently from acid rain. (Source: ibid)
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Figure 7 Areas where mainly SO2 contributed and acid rain has mainly been distributed
(Source: Asian Development Bank, November 2001)
The southern boundary of acid rain regions in China is the Pearl River delta and the
central and the eastern areas of Guangxi. In 1997, the average pH value there was higher,
but the acid rain frequency had increased. (Source: ibid)
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The western boundary of acid rain regions in China is Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and Sichuan
Basin. The acid rain pollution there was also very serious. The average pH value in
Chongqing (The biggest city of Sichuan Basin) was lower than 5.0 and the acid rain
frequency was 70%. (Source: ibid)
The eastern boundary of acid rain regions in China is the south of Yangtze River. 75% of
the area has average pH value lower than 5. Four cities of the area have the pH value
lower than 4.5. Acid rain frequency in the cities of the area is higher than 90%. (Source:
ibid)
Central China is the area that suffered most from acid rain, with the average pH value
lower than 5.0, and the acid rain frequency higher than 70%. (Source: ibid)
2.3.3 Effects of acid rain
Damage for animals
There is a strong relationship between higher acid and the lowering of populations offish
in lakes. Acid in water inhibits the production of enzymes which enable trout larvae to
escape their eggs. Phytoplankton growth is inhibited by high acid levels, and animals
which feed on it suffer. Many lakes are subject to natural acid runoff from acid soils, and
this can be triggered by particular rainfall patterns that concentrate the acid.
Damage for plants
Trees are harmed by acid rain in a variety of ways. The waxy surface of leaves is broken
down and nutrients are lost, making trees more susceptible to frost, fungus and insects.
Root growth slows and as a result, less nutrients are taken up. Toxic ions are mobilised
in the soil, and valuable minerals are leached away or become bound to clay. (Source:
baed on http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Acidrain)
Damage for health
Acidic deposition has very real health danger to man. Exposure to sulfuric acid, nitric
acid and small size particles can result in damaged lung tissue, development of asthma
and chronic bronchitis. Old people and children are usually the most vulnerable.
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Acid rain seems to bring toxic methyl mercury into the food chain. The health of people,
especially children and infants as well as mother's unborn babies, is at high risk due to
polluted food (meat, fruit and vegetable) from acidic areas. Mercury exposure can cause
severe damage to our brain and central nervous system as well as to our kidneys.
In the Chongqing, the largest and most recently declared autonomous zone, a recent study
found that several symptoms, including reduced pulmonary function and increased
mortality, hospital admissions and emergency room visits, were correlated with high
levels of air pollution, especially SO2 and TSP there. (Source: World Resources 1998-99:
Environmental change and human health) Another of China's largest city, Shenyang, is
estimated that total mortality increased by 2 percent with each 100 micrograms per cubic
meter increase in SO2 concentration, and by 1 percent for each 100 micrograms per cubic
meter in TSP. (Source: Xu Zhaoyi et al., 1996)
Damage for Buildings and structures
Acid rain can harm both the natural and man-made environment through the erosion.
Acid rain can damage building components such as stone, mortar, paint, and metals.
Moreover, acid deposition can cause accelerated erosion of infrastructure such as
railroads, airplanes, statues and even historic objects, etc.
Impacts for economy
Measuring the impacts of acid precipitation is still not very exact, but the current
estimates are not encouraging. Some studies find that acid deposition has already placed
the total costs of acid precipitation in China between 2 and 7 percent of GDP. And the
most detailed accounting shows that in the areas that acid precipitation hits hardest, the
cost of remedial action there outweigh a ratio of 2.51 to 1 at the high end and a ratio of
1.25 to 1 at the low end. (Source: Eric Zusman, 2002)
Over the past few years, the huge domestic losses make Chinese government begin to
recognize that sustainable economic development was the most important fact to face,
and Chinese government paid unprecedented attention to the environmental protection.
2.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter the Chinese energy consumption and the air pollution caused by the
energy consumption are introduced. The trend of Chinese energy consumption and the
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resulting air pollution are analysed: coal is still the dominant resource to meet the fast
developing economy in china. The SO2 emissions from burning coal are and will
continue to be a serious issue for a long time, and the coal-fired power plants are the
single, largest source of SO2 emissions in China. The main result of SO2 emissions is acid
rain which badly influences the environment, the living standard, and results in a huge
economic loss. As a result of the Chinese government's concern of the SO2 pollution
problem since 1990s, the total SO2 emissions decreased in a short period, but there is still
a strong trend of increasing SO2 emissions. This is caused by the power industry. That is
why the study on controlling SO2 emission especially from power sector is meaningful
and important.
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Chapter III Environmental regulation and SO2 pollution
control in China
From the surface pollution situation in China to understand deeper what is the root of the
Chinese environmental problem, why is that, understanding Chinese environmental
regulation and the history of SO2 pollution controlling and its policy making is necessary.
This chapter is focused on introducing and analyzing environmental administration and
legislation and SO2 pollution control in China.
3.1 China's environmental administration and legislation
3.1.1 General introduction to Chinese environmental administration
The National People's Congress (NPC): NPC is in principal the organ responsible for the
enactment of laws and policy documents that are identified in the Constitution. The NPC
is the highest-level legislative institution in China. The NPC has the power to enact and
amend "fundamental" national statutes, such as the Civil Law, including statutes related
to the establishment and organization of other government institutions.
The Environmental and Resources Protection Committee (ERPC): one of the eight
committees in the standing committees of NPC. ERPC is responsible for drafting
legislation and the supervision of government performance in the environmental sector.
The State Council: The State Council may enact administrative regulations in accordance
with the Constitution and applicable law. The Council State consists of 29 ministers.
At the highest level are the NPC, the newly formed ERPC and the State Council, all of
them serve advisory, as well as drafting and oversight rules with respect to environmental
legislation and regulations.
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA): is a newly established ministry-
level entity, SEPA is responsible for formulating national environmental rules, methods
and standards.
Ministries related to environment: Ministries in China are lead directly by State Council.
The ministries related to environment are: The State Development Planning Commission,
the State Economic and the Trade Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
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Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Agriculture,
the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the
Ministry of Communications. (Source: UNDP report 2002)
At the local level provincial environmental protection agencies, as well as municipal and
county EPBs, oversee the compliance with the national environmental statutes,
regulations, rules, methods, and standards, as well as local counterparts enacted by local
people's congresses and standing committees. The structure of the Chinese
environmental administration is shown in Figure 8.
The National People's Congress State Council
Environmental and Resources
Protection Committee
Provincial
governments
Ministries related to
environment
SEPA
Municipal
government
Provincial EPBs
Municipal EPBs
Lead directly
Lead indirectly
Figure 8 The structure of Chinese environmental administration
3.1.2 General introduction to Chinese environmental legislation
In 1979, the Standing Committee of the NPC enacted China's first major environmental
statute, the Environmental Protection Law (EPL). This law brought China's
environmental protection work of the infant legal system and laid the foundation for
future environmental legislation. The EPL essentially provides the general framework for
allocating administrative responsibilities, identifies target areas for environmental
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protection and natural resources conservation work, specifies measures for the control of
environmental pollution and other public hazards, and outlines legal liabilities for
violations. The EPL is potentially applicable to all regulated entities, and thus should be
consulted in conjunction with subsequent media-specific legislation. "Since 1979, 16
laws dealing with pollution control and natural resource conservation have been enacted
by theNPC". (Source: Sinosphere, volume 1)
At the next level of authority, regulations are generally more technical and specific,
which are issued by the State Council. The State Council has issued more than 20
regulations specifically addressing environmental protection and natural resource
conservation since 1979. (Source: ibid)
In addition to the system of regulations, Environmental Rules, Methods, and Standards
(they are so called rule, method, standard, as well as regulations, actually, they are real
laws, they can be seen as the detail explanations of laws in China) documents are at still a
lower level of authority, which are formulated by SEPA, other ministries and agencies
under the State Council. Standards documents generally provide numerical bases for
compliance that must be used in reference to regulations, rules, and methods. Without
accompanying legislation, standards documents do not have any independent legal
meaning. Rules and methods, however, prescribe conduct for the regulated community
and have independent legal relevance. "Over 100 environmental rules and methods and
350 standards have been issued since 1979." (Source: ibid)
At the local level, the provinces, municipalities formulate local environmental protection
regulations that must be based on national environmental statutes but can address the
unique social and economic conditions of the localities. Local Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EPBs), commissions, and sometimes offices are delegated the authority to enact
rules, methods, and standards. "SEPA's general standards for environmental protection,
quality, and pollutant emissions to be applied nationwide and to particular regions, serve
as guidelines to local environmental protection administrations. Officially, the national
legislation limits the legislative acts of local authorities. Local governments are
authorized under Chinese law to pass more stringent environmental standards but may
not enact more lenient standards." (Source: ibid)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays an important role and even the decisive role in
environmental matters in China. As any other issue, an environmental matter should be
considered by CCP. When CCP has an idea of how to solve the matter or change the
situation then the decision of CCP can be transferred to a law or regulation by the
legislature. Without the agreement of the legislature the intention of CCP cannot be
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legislated, and such an intention cannot be implemented neither. Normally, the legislature
will pass most of the CCP's proposals. There is a strong focus on the emissions trading
system in China, and both the CCP members from the legislature and the government feel
that the problem of SO2 pollution has to be dealt with. Therefore the members of the
Environmental and Resources Protection Committee (most of them are CCP members
and part of them are not a CCP member) will discuss and poll the related law or
regulation. The more intensively the party concerns itself with the problem, the more
certain it is that the related legislation will be passed.
3.2 The existing environmental policies for controlling SO2 emission in
China
3.2.1 Pollution Levy System in China
3.2.1.1 The primary PLS in China
China's pollution levy system began from the Stockholm Conference in 1972. The idea
of a pollution levy was formally adopted by the central government in 1978, and the
"Trial of Environmental Protection Law" enacted in 1979, stated that "the levy should be
imposed on pollution discharges which exceed national pollution discharge standards,
based on quantity and concentration of discharges and levy fee schedules established by
the State Council."
The pilot project about PLS started soon, and by the end of 1981, 27 of China's 29
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities had established programs of such type.
(Source: Hua Wang, David Wheele, 1999)
After summarizing these local experiences, the central government issued an "Interim
Procedure on Pollution Charges" in February 1982. The procedure defined the system's
objectives, principles, levy standards, levy collection methods, and principles for fund
usage. Nationwide implementation rapidly followed (Source: ibid). The Pollution Levy
System has experienced over 20 years in China.
Chinese PLS is based on the polluter-pays principle. It requires that a fee should be paid
by any enterprise whose effluent discharge exceeds the legal standard. That means "the
levies are mainly based on how many times the concentration of the pollution exceeds
that of the legal standards." (Source: ibid) Levies are charged only on the worst pollutant
from each source. For example, at the end of pollution discharging pipe, several kinds of
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air emissions are discharged (such as SO2, CO2, NOX, etc). In these discharges, the
concentration of SO2 is biggest, so the company just needs to pay the levy of SO2
emission. Assumption that A — concentration of SO2 from company; B — concentration
of legal standard of SO2; T — total amount of SO2 emission from the company; R —
levy rate for SO2 pollution. So, the levy that company should pay = Rx[(A-B)/B]xT.
(Based on: ibid)
Apart from controlling pollution from companies, another main function of PLS is
supporting EPBs in China. The main agency responsible for collecting charges is the
financial department, which decides on the size of the charge based on data provided by
the environmental monitoring department and those submitted by enterprise. The
different levels of government carry out the actual charge collection. The PLS was first
applied to SO2 emission 20 years ago as a fee of RMB 0.04 per kg (it's about $ 0.005 per
kg SO2). With the increased emphasis on SO2 emission control in the 1990s, the PLS rate
was increased to RMB 0.2 per kg (about $ 0.024 per kg SO2). 80% of the charges refund
to companies for treating pollution, and another part of them funding the EPBs. (Source:
OECD 1997)
China's pollution levy is the extensive pollution charge system in China. In the pollution
control aspect "SEPA reported in 1994 that the SO2 Pollution Levy System was
successful in reducing emissions by controlling existing pollution sources and new
pollution sources." (Source: Barbara A. Finamore, June 2000). And in the charge
collecting aspect, "from the early 1980's to 1996, Chinese regulators have collected about
30 billion RMB from more than 500,000 Chinese major polluters. In 1996 alone, the
system collected about 4 billion RMB." (Hua Wang, et al., 1996)
3.2.1.2 The reformed PLS in China
The reform was met with criticism
The introduction of PLS in China shows that PLS has certain effects to reduce pollution
as well as to support EPBs by finance. But some problems of the PLS are not easy to
solve.
The criticism begins with the rates at which the levy is assessed. In the case of SO2 the
emission sources have been subject to a national standard of 0.2 Yuan per kilogram of
sulphur dioxide emissions, approximately $0.024 per kilogram. Most emission sources in
China prefer pay the pollution levy to invest in other technical solutions such as
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purchasing desulfurizing scrubbers or washed coal. These techniques are relatively more
expensive.
hi addition to levy rates other objections have challenged the way the levy is calculated.
The levy was only charged on the single pollutant most in excess of standards. This
means that the government just levy the most expensive one. It is simple and effective at
the beginning of implementing PLS, but it became unreasonable with China's fast
development, and more and more complicated emissions were included in one source. As
a result it is difficult to control the total emission in the area.
The sharpest criticism of the PLS is aimed at the accounting rules. According to these
rules as much as 80% of pollution fees will be returned to the polluting enterprise to
subsidize abatement projects and clean up activities, and the remaining percentage will be
returned to the EPBs of China. It leads to ineffective use of PLS revenue by the owners of
polluting enterprises, because such a big percent (80%) of levy will be returned to the
power plants. This makes the plants feel that paying the levy or not is not important, and
the regulators may feel the same, too. Thus the power plants delay to pay the full amount
of levy, and the regulators are indifferent to charge the levy totally. This way the
pollution levy system is becoming worthless.
Implementing PLS under Total Emission Control (TEC) policy
In order to reduce the SO2 emission, a new concept — The Total Emission Control is
introduced to the PLS in China. TEC sets a "ceiling" on SO2 emissions, addresses trans-
boundary emissions issues and changes the concentration-based principle to amount-
based principle, thus it overcomes the shortcomings of the concentration-based principle,
according to which emissions from every plant may meet the standard. But the amount of
total emissions in a region is still increasing. "The concept of TEC was proposed by
China State Council and SEPA in 1996, and was written in the 2000 revision of the Air
Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPCA) of The People's Republic of China."
(Source: A Denny Ellerman, Number 2, 2003) Thereby, TEC became the newest and the
most important element of China's PLS. "The Tenth Five-year Plan (2001 - 2005) has set
a national TEC ceiling for 2005 of 18 million tons for China (approximately 10% below
2000) level), and a more restricted total of 10 million tons for Two Control Zones."
(Source: US embassy report) "But there is no clearly specified and credible sanctions
about exceeding the ceiling." (Source: A Denny Ellerman, Number 2, 2003) In other
words, the ceiling in TEC is not a fixed cap, but it can be seen as a measure for judging if
the pollution controls are effective.
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The reformed PLS under the concept of TEC is trying to achieve both environmental and
administrative benefits. A levy rate is made of each pollutant according to its
harmfulness. Because a uniform rate is charged, the reformed PLS simplifies the task of
levying and avoids ignoring the environmental harm of the sources. Comparing the
primary PLS with reformed PLS, we can see that the primary one allows polluters to
discharge the pollutants as much as they want if their pollution concentration is lower
than government's standards. The reformed one limits the polluters to discharge under a
specified level; the primary one just levies for the most polluted emission from many
different sorts of emissions from one source, but the reformed one levies the charge when
any pollution is discharged. The levy collecting is proportional to the total discharged
pollution.
Allocation of revenue
The obvious question is how much revenue the reformed PLS will bring in. For the aim
of the revenue, using funds raised by the levy will continue to support the environmental
administration at all levels with about 30 percent (the exact figure is still under
negotiation) for this purpose. With the remaining 70 percent three funds will be created.
The Municipal and the County Fund will receive 80 percent, the Provincial Fund 15
percent, and the National Fund 5 percent. These funds are designed to fill the investment
gap in pollution control caused by capital shortages and by inadequate general
government revenue due to the existing levy structure. (Source: Robert A. Bohm, 1998)
The PLS fund will be strictly managed by the financial departments and the EPBs as an
earmarked fund. The right for EPBs to allocate the PLS fund will be reduced with the
process of fiscal reform. (Source: Jinnan Wang)
Charging the levy
In the dominated areas in China the levy rate for SO2 is still RMB 0.2 per kg. From 1998
higher levy rates have been tried: new sources face levy rate of RMB 0.4 per kg, and a
Total Emission Charges pilot program with a higher levy rate of RMB 0.63 per kg was
initiated. (Meng et al., 1999) Hangzhou, Zhengzhou and Jilin have finished the pilot, the
polluter's response is active. But in Beijing the SO2 charge rate is 0.60—1.20 yuan/kg was
strongly rejected by the polluters. (Source: Jinnan Wang) The various higher levy rates
have been extended to the Acid Rain and SO2 Pollution Control Zones (see the following
Two Control Zones) in 2000. "In 2002, the national SO2 emission levy charges achieved
RMB 1.15 billion (about $140 million)." (Source: Jintian Yang, et al)
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3.2.2 Two Control Zones
Based on areas affected by acid rain and high SO2 concentrations in 1998, the
government identified key acid rain control and SO2 pollution control zones, called Two
Control Zones (TCZs). The Acid Rain Control Zone consists of the areas that the
average annual pH values for precipitate are less than or equal to 4.5. The SO2 Pollution
Control Zone consists of areas with annual average ambient SO2 concentrations over
Class II standards and daily average concentrations over Class III standards. (Source:
Jintian Yang and Jeremy Schreifels)
TCZs include 175 cities in 27 provinces in China. 112 cities are in Acid Rain Control
Zone, and 63 are in the SO2 Pollution Control Zone. Total area of TCZs is 1,090,000
km , 14.4% of the whole country area. Acid Rain Control Zone covers 800,000 km ,
8.4% of the country area; SO2 Pollution Control Zone covers 290,000 km2, 6% of the
country area. (Source: Liu Zi, 2002)
The major goals of the plan during the Tenth Five-year Plan of TCZs are, reducing 20%
SO2 emissions, alleviating the acid rain pollution situation, and reaching the class II SO2
standard of National Ambient Quality Standard in 80% cities in TCZs. (Source: ibid)
The plan of TCZs will be implemented mainly by local governments. SEPA will
supervise the implementation of the plan of TCZs by strengthening monitoring,
information management, scientific and technological research, standards and education,
law enforcement of SO2 emission and acid rain control.
In general, TCZs are important areas for controlling acid rain and SO2 emissions in
China. TCZs have more serious SO2 and acid rain pollution problem compared with other
regions in China, they also have priority for investment and management to control the
pollution. That shows the government's big decision for reducing the SO2 pollution
problem.
3.3 Analysis
Analysis 1: answers the question of Chapter II
Chapter II presents this phenomenon: from 1995 to 2000, with the Chinese government's
strict requirement of reducing SO2 pollution, the total amount of China's SO2 emissions
were apparently reduced. Of course, the decrease of SO2 emission is contributed by the
efforts of most of the SO2 emitters. Another important reason is that the Chinese
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government devotes lots of energy to solve the problem1. But SO2 pollution has been
increasing since 2000. What does the mean to China's SO2 control management?
The question needs to be analyzed based on the Chinese economic development,
environmental policy and institution situation foundation.
With China's fast economic development, people's demands also increase fast. The huge
amount of new established plants has made clear the inconsistency of economic
development and environmental protection.
Further more, even when all utilities implement the government's measure of abating
pollution and all achieve the government's concentration standard (at that period the
primary PLS had been implemented in most areas in China), how could a concentration-
based instrument ensure that the total amount of emission would not be exceeded? Let us
consider the reformed PLS; it involves the concept of TEC, but there are not any
regulations made yet, about what will happen to the utilities if they exceed the ceiling.
Maybe the sanctions will be issued in the future, since the TEC is still at a draft stage; but
at present it somehow weakens the power of the policy.
By studying the Chinese environmental administration and legislation institution we find
that the disadvantage of the environmental management originates from the root of the
administrative institution. The NPC is the principle legislation organ and it should be in
charge of legislating issues. The State Council is an administrative organ. It should
implement the laws from NPC. SEP A, especially, is an environmental administrative
organ. It should just implement environmental laws from NPC. But tradition China's
institution is that the administrative organ can legislate regulations, methods and rules.
They are not called laws but they are, in effect, laws. The local government can change
the so-called regulations or standards according the local situation. Because the
legislation and administration are not separate institutions the local government can make
regulations in accordance with its own interests without the necessary environmental
considerations. The implementing progress, legislation and implementation bodies
function in the same way. So bribery from emitting sources and corruption among the
managers in the government is inevitable. I do not, of course, in numbers know the exact
impact and damage that is made to the environmental protective program because of
these unfortunate mechanisms, but no doubt, it ruins the environmental protective
program more or less.
1
 including shutting down small, inefficient plants, revising new regulation, etc.
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This was a general analysis of environmental legislation and administration and the
current SO2 pollution-control regulation in China. Considering the aim of the project —
the emissions trading system, even the current pollution management with the PLS being
replaced by the ETS, i.e. the concentrated based control is promoted to a total amount
based control; but the ETS will face the same problems as what presented above —
works inefficiently due to the fact that Chinese legislation power and government power
are not separated clearly.2 Therefore — if Chinese legal authority is strong enough — it is
a necessary condition to implement ETS in China. This problem will be discussed and
analyzed in Chapter VII3.
In general it is natural that SO2 emission is reduced under the Chinese government's rush
action, but reducing SO2 should not be thought as a "sprint" process, the problem in the
Chinese environmental institution should be solved, otherwise, it is extremely difficult
for the government to solve the SO2 problem in a foreseeable future.
Analysis 2: the reformed PLS in China
The reformed PLS in China can be seen as a legislative and administrative adjustment to
match the rapid pace of development in China. The reformed PLS does address the
shortcomings in the primary PLS, and especially speeds the change from concentration-
based control to total amount control. In the reformed PLS, the levy is charged when any
pollutant emitted from a plant, and it's charged for all kinds of pollutants. The levy rate
of SO2 is relative higher than before. This may stimulate the resources to improve their
ability to reduce pollution. The last difference and also the merit of reformed PLS is that
the PLS fund is used more transparently.
Well, a common dispute between the policy makers and the utilities is the levy rate. The
current levy is clearly not high enough to create incentives to change enterprises'
behaviour to reduce air pollution. Therefore, the Chinese government has tried higher
levy rate in some cities. Some of them accepted the higher levy rate, some not. Beijing
has tried that, and the city's environmental situation is improving. But most plants
complain that the new rate is too high. The reason for this is not just the high levy rate.
The government's commands and control methods are obstacles to plants' SO2 abatement
action, especially small emissions sources. Because command and control methods limit
measures of reducing the emission of each plant. It is impossible for each source to be
used in a flexible way to reduce emission. As the abatement amount climbs, the marginal
2
 it will be introduced and analyzed in Chapter IV
3
 see the detail of "Is there adequate legal authority in China?" in Chapter VII
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cost4 for pollution control will become more and more expensive in order to achieve even
a small reduction of emissions. The small plants cannot afford such expensive costs, and
flexible ways seem even more crucial for them. In the cases of Hangzhou, Zhengzhou
and Jilin, the plants there are levied with a bit lower levy rate than Beijing. The pilot
project is going well there. It most likely that the levying costs of SC^emission are lower
than the marginal costs, even implementing under a unique, inflexible command and
control system, the plants there still prefer to pay relatively lower levy.
In general, even though the reformed PLS has more positive merit than the former PLS, it
also contains problems. The main challenge the PLS faces is how to assign the levy rate,
and how to implement it equally, stimulate emission source's positively. Thereby, the
thesis focuses on analysis if a market-based instrument can solve the problem.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter China's legislative and administrative situations about environmental
protection are introduced. The role of the Chinese Communist Party in legislature and
government has been analyzed. Compared to the former PLS, the three new
environmental policies — reformed PLS, TCZs and TEC have been introduced and
analyzed. By analyzing the legislation and the implementation of the policies and the
characters of the reformed PLS, the remaining problems in Chinese environmental
legislative and administrative institution have been pointed out; and the problem is
narrowing down to the discussion of the trial of the emissions trading system in China.
Furthermore, the reasons why China's PLS should be changed to a market-based
instrument have been explained.
4
 the amount of money a source will need to spend to reduce the next ton of emissions of a specific
pollutant. (Source: EPA, June 2003)
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Chapter IV The theory of emissions trading and practice of
SO2 emissions trading in the US
Emissions trading is an economic instrument to reduce environmental pollution, and is
used all over the world. This chapter introduces the history and the principle of the
emissions trading, studies the American experiences of implementing emissions trading
in the US, and explains why China should adopt emissions trading to cope with its SO2
pollution problem.
4.1 The theory of emissions trading
The concept of using tradable right as a means of pollution control was first suggested in
1968 by the Canadian economist John Dales, and the first emissions trading programme
was implemented in the United States following the Clean Air Act amendments of 1997.
Provisions for international emissions trading for greenhouse gases were then included in
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Since then, more and more countries in the world are interested
in using emissions trading to solve their own pollution problems.
4.1.1 What is emissions trading
The term "Emissions trading" can be explained as a market-based regulatory system that
allows partners in the market to trade emissions permits, or credits for reduction as a way
of reducing air pollution. (Source: National Round Table on the Environment and the
Economy, 2002) For example, consider two companies, A and B, both of them emit
quantities of pollutant. Their emissions may damage the air quality, and the relevant
authorities may decide that emissions should be reduced by a given amount, say by 10
per cent. By traditional way, the solution seems simple: both A and B cut their emissions
by 10 per cent. But in the real world, this may impose very different burdens on the two
companies: Company A may be able to reduce its emissions by 10 per cent or even more
at a relatively low cost. Company B, on the other hand, may find it more difficult and
expensive to implement. In words, company A can reduce its emissions by the required
amount at relatively low costs and can then make further profitable reductions. For
company B the costs of reductions are far greater and it would welcome a way of
avoiding some of the costs. Let us suppose that company A agrees to make those
additional reductions instead of company B, provided company B is prepared to pay for
them at a price that is above the costs to A but below what it the costs to company B. In
this case emissions are cut as a whole by the required amount. Company B saves money,
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company A earns a profit for its additional reductions, and the total costs are reduced. It
is this potential difference in reduction costs between A and B that creates a market
opportunity. And in this simplified model of a trading system, it does not matter if the
companies really reduce the pollution or not (such as company B), because the total
reduction of pollution will be reduced; the result is that the aim of total amount reduction
of pollution will be achieved.
4.1.2 How does emissions trading reduce costs
Table 3 and Table 4 demonstrate how emissions trading can provide cost savings.
Continuing the example from above, and assuming that the regulator requires a 10 per
cent reduction in a total of 150,000 tonnes of pollutant emitted by A and B sources and
also assuming that A and B companies are in different situations such as different
technologies or different materials, then the costs of these two companies to achieve the
target will be different. Assuming that source A could achieve the required 10 per cent
reduction at a cost of $2 per tonne reduced, while source B cost $5 per tonne reduced for
the same percentage reduction. So, the numerical example is showed in the following
Table 3 and 4:
Current emissions
Required reduction
(10%)
Actually emissions
reduction
Cost per tonne
reduced
Compliance cost
with conventional
regulation
Emissions after
reduction
Source A
50,0001
5,0001
5,000
$2
$10,000
45,0001
Source B
100,0001
10,0001
10,0001
$5
$50,000
90,000 t
Total
150,000 t
15,0001
15,000 t
$60,000
135,0001
Table 3 Compliance cost without emissions trading (Based on: UNEP, UCCEE and
UNCTAD, 2002)
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Allowance
allocation
Reductions
implemented
Cost of reductions
implemented
Allowances sold
Allowances
purchased
Price per allowance
Revenue from sale
of allowances
Cost of purchasing
allowances
Compliance cost
with trading
Savings relative to
no trading
Savings relative to
no trading (%)
Source A
45,000 t
10,0001
$20,000
5,000 t
None
$3.5/t
$17,500
No purchases
$20,000-$17,500 =
$2,500
$10,000-$2,500=
$7,500
75%
Source B
90,0001
5,000 t
$25,000
None
5,0001
$3.5/t
No sales
$17,500
$25,000+ $17,500=
$42,500
$50,000-$42,500=
$7,500
15%
Total
135,000 t
15,0001
$45,000
$45,000
$15,000
25%
Table 4 Compliance cost and cost savings with emissions trading (Based on: UNEP,
UCCEE and UNCTAD, 2002)
Table 3 shows us how the compliance costs with conventional regulation. Now let us see
Table 4 — what happens if emissions trading is introduced? Source A, which has low
costs for emission reduction, can implement reduction over the required amount and sell
the surplus to source B which has higher costs for emission reduction. Assume that
source A can reduce its emissions by up to 10,000 tonnes at a cost of $2 per tonne
reduced and that additional reductions cost in excess of $ 5 per tonne reduced. Source A
implements the 10,000 tonnes reduction, but it needs only 5,000 tonnes of reduction for
its own compliance. This means it has 5,000 tonnes of allowances can be sold to Source
B. And source B still needs to reduce its own emissions by 5,000 tonnes to meet its
reduction requirement. The price per allowance would be between $2 per tonne and $5
per tonne. This example assumes a price of $3.5 per tonne. Table 4 will tell us how much
the compliance cost and the cost savings are with emissions trading joining in.
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"From Table 3 and 4, we can see the total compliance cost for source A is just $2,500, it
saves $ 7,500. And the total compliance cost for source B, is $4,200, it saves $7,500. The
total cost of achieving the emissions limit for both company A and company B is
$45,000." (Based on: ibid) hi short, using the way of emissions trading, the emissions
target is achieved, the total cost is lower and each source has shard in the cost savings.
4.1.3 The types of emissions trading
There are three basic types of emissions trading programs: "baseline and credit", "offset"
and "cap and trade".
4.1.3.1 Baseline and credit
"The participants in a baseline and credit program have to earn credits before they can
begin trading. The regulator defines an emission baseline for each participant. The
baseline often varies with the level of output. At the end of the compliance period, the
regulatory authority compares the baseline calculation with the actual emissions from the
source during the period." (Based on: ibid) Participants whose actual emissions are lower
than their baselines receive credits, normally 1 credit is fixed to equal to 1 tonne of
pollution. Credits can then be traded freely. If a participant's actual emissions exceed its
baseline, it must buy credits to achieve compliance. The American lead in gasoline and
heavy-duty engine emission standards programs are baseline and credit programs.
4.1.3.2 Offset
"Offset programs are used to average the additional emissions from a new source or from
expanding an existing one. Under such program, the existing sources that are responsible
for new or expanding sources buy credits to achieve emission reductions. The
requirement to offset is mandatory for the new or expanding source but the decision by
existmg sources to reduce is voluntary. For the new and expanding sources, the baseline
is any emissions they are not required to offset; if they are required to offset all of the
increase in their emissions the baseline is zero." (Based on: ibid) The US Clean Air Act
makes provision for large, new and expanding sources to offset their emissions in areas
with poor air quality.
4.1.3.3 Cap and trade
'The cap and trade program is the regulator establishes a total amount of a pollutant that
the participants in the program are allowed to emit in a given period — the cap." (Source:
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ibid) The sum of the distributed allowances is equal to the cap. There are two types of
distribution: free or by auction. Once the allowances are distributed, they may be traded
freely. "During the compliance period, each participant must monitor or calculate its
actual emissions using specified procedures. And at the end of the period, each
participant must hand over to the authority allowances that are equal to its actual
emissions during the period. The US Acid Rain Program by electric utilities is a good
example of using cap and trade." (Based on: ibid)
4.2 US SO2 cap and trade program
4.2.1 Short history of American emissions trading
American efforts to address air pollution effectively started in 1970s with the passage of
the Clean Air Act (CAA). Despite the successful free market economic system existing in
the U.S., command and control type programs in America's environmental protection
actions were in dominant status.
The implementation of CAA has yielded big environmental benefits. "EPA's 1991 report
on 'The Cost of a Clean Environment' provides the following summary of progress in
reducing emissions of criteria air pollutants between 1970 to 1988: particulate emissions
reduced 70%; SO2 reduced 42%; NOX reduced 28%; Volatile Organic Compounds
(VOCs) reduced 42%; CO reduced 57% and lead emissions reduced 97%. " (Source:
OECD 1997)
Despite the big progress of reducing pollutants in US in the mid 1970s, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faced the situation that some parts of the
country, especially southern California, did not meet air quality standards. And EPA's
1991 report also said that in 1987, "millions of people still lived in counties with air
quality levels exceeding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). (Source:
OECD 1997)
To solve these problems, the CAA was amended in 1990 and 1997. Most of the new
amendments were designed to address either new environmental problems or to address
implementation issues. In the areas that cannot meet NAAQS, the amended CAA requires
new sources, and existing sources that want to expand their facilities to offset their
additional emissions by acquiring emission reduction credits from existing sources. This
pragmatic response to the need to allow economic development whilst also addressing the
air quality constraint was gradually widened to the extent that the 1990 CAA
Amendments authorized a variety of emission trading schemes. Title IV of this
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legislation provides the institutional and statutory framework for the US Acid Rain
Program, which in 1990 established the first large-scale, long-term US environmental
program to rely on emission permits (Source: A. Denny Ellerman et al., 1999).
While America does not want to totally delete its traditional command and control
approaches to protect environment, America is still looking at the potential application of
economic incentives to address its environmental problems on the basis of using
command and control approaches.
4.2.2 Framework of the US Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain Program is the largest, best known, and most successful experience with
emissions trading is the sulphur dioxide cap-and-trade program created by Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. (Source: A. Denny Ellerman et al., 2003)
Goal of Acid Rain Program
The overall goal of the Acid Rain Program is to achieve significant environmental and
public health benefits through reductions in emissions of SO2 and NOX — the primary
causes of acid rain. To achieve this goal at the lowest cost to society, the program
employs both traditional and innovative, market-based approaches for controlling air
pollution. In addition, the program encourages the efficiency of using energy and
pollution prevention.
The Acid Rain Program created a national cap of roughly nine million tons of SO2
emissions per year from electricity generating plants. The national target was to be
achieved in two phases. During Phase I, from 1995 through 1999, the 263 electricity
generating units which create most serious SO2 emissions were subject to an interim cap
that required average emissions from these units to be no greater than approximately 2.5
pounds of SO2 per million Btu of heat input. In Phase II, beginning in 2000, the program
tightened the annual emissions limits imposed on these large, higher emitting plants and
also set restrictions on smaller, cleaner plants fired by coal, oil, and gas, encompassing
over 2,000 units in all, and to limit emissions from these facilities to a cap of
approximately nine million tons — which implies an average emission rate of less than
1.2 pounds of SO2 per million Btu. The final Phase II cap will reduce total SO2 emission
from electricity generating units to about half of what they had been in the early 1980s.
Allowances allocation
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This cap on national SO2 emissions was implemented by issuing tradable allowances (an
cap and trade form is the core in Acid Rain Program), and by requiring that the owners of
all fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units surrender an allowance for every ton of
SO2 emissions. Allowances are allocated to owners of affected units free of charge,
generally in proportion to each unit's average annual heat input during the three-year
baseline period, 1985-87. If allowances not used by the electricity units in the year, they
can be banked for future use or sale. A small percentage (2.8 percent) of the allowances
allocated to affected units are withheld for distribution through an annual auction
conducted by the EPA to encourage trading and to ensure the availability of allowances
for new generating units. The revenues from this auction are returned on a proportional
basis to the owners of the existing units from whose allocations the allowances are
withheld.
Banking
Participants can either sell unused SO2 allowances to other participants or bank them for
use or sale in future years. However, participants cannot use allowances before the year
they are issued. To date, Phase I utilities that have been able to reduce their SO2
emissions have tended to bank their allowances. They may use these allowances to offset
future emissions when stricter emission limits come into force, or sell them when the
allowance price is more favourable.
The Allowance Tracking System
EPA has instituted an electronic record-keeping and notification system called the
Allowance Tracking System (ATS) to track allowance transactions and the status of
allowance accounts. ATS is the official tally of allowances by which EPA determines
compliance with the emissions limitations. Any party interested in participating in the
trading system may open an ATS account by submitting an application to EPA. Accounts
contain information on unit account balances, account representatives (which must be
appointed by each trading party), and serial numbers for each allowance. ATS is
computerized to expedite the flow of data and to assist in the development of a viable
market for allowances. (Source: www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/overview.html)
Penalties
There is a high degree of confidence in the allowance trading system because non-
compliance is easily discovered and the penalty for non-compliance is expensive. If SO2
emissions exceed the number of allowances held by a participant, the EPA imposes
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statutory penalties. "Every excess ton of SO2 emitted automatically incurs a fee of
$2,500. This fee is much higher than the price of SO2 allowances (analysts expected the
marginal cost of reduction to be between $300 and $800 per ton, but allowance prices
were around $100 per ton in 1996)." (Source: OECD 1997, Lessons learned from United
States SO2 Allowance Trading) In addition to this fee, "the EPA deducts one allowance
from the participant's entitlement for the following year for each ton over their emission
limit." (Source: ibid) These strict enforcement provisions have facilitated political
acceptance of trading.
4.3 Analysis on the meanings of emissions trading to China
The meanings of trading in an emissions trading program can be demonstrated through
the comparison between ETS and other instruments for reducing pollution. In the case of
China, the comparison between ETS and the Chinese command control regulation, and
between ETS and Chinese existing PLS can answer the question as to why the emissions
trading is chosen to reduce China's SO2 pollution.
4.3.1 Cost saving
Emissions trading has been successful in saving costs when the emission reduction aims
are achieved. The Acid Rain program is the solid evidence of cost saving. From the
theory of emissions trading we can see that the trading is the key reason for cost saving.
For example, under the command and control situation — China's current condition, two
companies are involved in this system — the cost of reducing a specified amount of
emissions would be different for these two companies. But the companies have to pay
their costs no matter how much they are, because they do not have other ways to achieve
the reduction. If a trading system joins in, the company with high marginal costs can buy
allowances from the companies with low marginal costs. This can be observed as the
high marginal cost company stops reducing emission with high costs and buys
allowances with relatively low price to reduce the emission. Of cause the price will be
between the low marginal costs and the high marginal costs.
4.3.2 Labor saving
The so-called labor saving here means that it is easier for regulators to implement the
emissions trading system, and thereby the ETS saves the labor source in the
administrative department. The labor saving comes from three aspects. Firstly: the
traditional Chinese way to examine if the resources are complying with the regulation or
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not is to set down a unique standard of emissions as well as the technology, and then send
a person or group frequently to check if the companies have installed the technology and
if they are controlling the emissions under the standard. It has lead to a big waste and
complains from the emissions sources, due to the fact that the sources may already have
achieved the emissions standard through their own technology. To an ETS it is not
necessary for regulators to design a special technology, but to encourage more kinds of
technologies. The flexible trading system gives the sources more rights to choose their
own methods to reduce emissions. In addition, it is not necessary for the regulator to
check the companies too often, because they can just have a look at the continuing
emissions monitor or use the way of materials balance calculations several times a year to
know the amount of emissions, without having to worry about the companies' discharge
anymore as the had to, when they were not being checked. Secondly: it is not necessary
for regulators to have the detailed information of each company's marginal costs. The
task of the regulator in allocating the allowance is mainly to allocate the allowance based
on the previous year's emissions data. Finally: the allowances are controlled by the
regulator. So issuing the allowances or not next year is also controlled by the regulator.
This means that if a company is incompliant with the regulations, the regulators have the
right to stop issuing allowances for the company, and the company has no allowances to
emit next year. This again means that although the compliance relationship within an
ETS system is necessary, the compliance problem will be less serious because the ETS at
least resolves the problem that exists in China's PLS, such as the negotiation between
incompliant companies and the regulator where a long time is needed to charge the fee
from the company which the regulators have no strict method to deal with.
4.3.3 Environment protection
The above mentioned advantages of the ETS do not make any compromise of
environmental protection. On the contrary, the use of emissions trading can achieve
environmental goals smoothly. According to the concept of emissions trading, we can see
that the resources do not have to reduce the SO2 emission on their own. They can buy
emissions permits from lower marginal companies. Both the buyer and the seller get a
benefit, and so do the environment because all the trading activities are working towards
keeping the emissions under the cap. The American Acid Rain Program has used the
emissions trading instrument and has reached a remarkable result. This means that using
the instrument of emissions trading can achieve cost savings without hurting the
environment, and the American Acid Rain Program is a successful case in demonstrating
that.
4.4 Conclusion
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In this chapter the concept of emissions trading and how it works are introduced. The
reason why emissions trading reduces costs has been analyzed and three different kinds
of emissions trading are shown. As a successful case America's Acid Rain Program has
been analyzed carefully. By comparing the ETS with the existing command and control
and PLS in China, we can draw the conclusion that the ETS is much better than the
present PLS, and that the ETS should be adopted by the Chinese government to control
the SO2 emission. Nevertheless, it may be a big challenge for the government and policy
makers, since most of the SO2 emissions trading schemes have been implemented in
developed countries due to their high economic level and their free markets.
41
Chapter V China's power industry
The power industry of China is an important part of the Chinese economic foundation, in
addition, it is now facing the most crucial stage of deepening its reform, and the Chinese
power industry is very important to the Chinese economic reform and the use of
economic instruments to solve environmental problems. Therefore, it is necessary in this
chapter to introduce and analyze China's power industry and the effect of the reform to
emissions trading.
5.1 The Chinese power industry and its relative environmental impacts
5.1.1 The background of China's power industry
The electricity industry was established in China in 1882. When the People's Republic of
China was established in 1949, its electricity industry was a system with 1.85 GW
installed capacity and 6,500 km transmission line. (Source: Chi Zhang, January 31, 2003)
By the end of 2001, the installed capacity of Chinese electricity industry was 338 GW,
and with electricity generation 1478 TWh. (Source: Power Grid Interconnections In
China 2001-2002, Xiaoxin Zhou, May 6, 2002)
Now China is the second largest country both in electricity production and consumption
in the world. From Figure 9, we can see that in the generation sector, thermal power plant
(mainly coal-fired) accounts for 75% of the total capacity and 82% of the electricity
produced, with hydro-power accounts for most of the rest and nuclear power accounts for
around 1% in both capacity and electricity. Some renewable energy for power generation
such as wind-power units, installed capacity is only 230 MW, which is too little to be
show in the figure 9. (Source: China Power Industry Yearbook 2000)
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Figure 9 Proportion of Capacity and Electricity (Source: ibid)
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For the fuel consumption, electricity accounts for about 35% of the total energy
consumed, with coal for about 43%, oil for about 20% and natural gas for about 2%. The
power industry accounts for 5% of the GDP and employs over 1.5 million people.
(Source: ACIL Consulting)
But the average level of power production and consumption is extremely low in China
due to the developing nature of the country and the heavy population. The per capita
installed capacity annually is only 24kW and 979kWh in 1999. The demand for power
has grown at an average rate of 8-10% annually for the last two decades and will keep
increasing at an average rate of 5-6% annually for the next decade. (Source: ibid)
Thereby, the coal use must be increasing fast with more and more electricity demand.
From the introduction above, we can see that China is a country with coal as its main
energy source. Although various kinds of energy such as oil, natural gas, hydropower and
nuclear power have been developed in recent decades, coal-fire power generation is and
will continue to be the major way of power production.
5.1.2 Environmental impacts from power industry in China
There is an inescapable linkage between energy use and the environment. The power
industry is the single largest stationary consumer of coal. Air pollution causes the large
environmental impacts that are experienced locally and nationally in China. Most of these
places are included in TCZs.
The following Figure 10 shows the power plants location areas in China and the amount
of SO2 they emitted. The power plants are mostly located in the coastal areas of China, or
in the coal-production cities in the internal mainland.
As mentioned before the heaviest environmental impact in China is due to the SO2
pollution in the power industry. I am not going to write anymore about it here, except that
the coal burning power plants are responsible for one-third of the SO2 discharged in
China. I am interested in the number of "one-third" because when comparing to the
United States, I notice that the American electricity production sector is about 2% of the
overall economy, yet it causes more than one-third of SO2 pollution. (Source: David
Moskovitz, 2000) This comparison makes me feel that the situations of China and US are
comparable, of course, the comparability is limited to power plants and SO2 air pollution.
Since the SO2 pollution situation in US is similar to that in China, at least in the aspects
of total SO2 emission amount and the percentage of SO2 emission from power sector, the
reduction of SO2 emission in US after adopting the ETS can be seen as a parameter for
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China — when designing the ETS in China, the parameter can provide a reference such
as how much the SO2 emission will be reduced, and how long time is needed to achieve
the goal, etc.
5.2 The ownership reform of China's power sector
5.2.1 The background of the ownership of electricity industry in China
At the beginning the Chinese electricity industry was organized essentially as a vertically
integrated state-owned utility since People's Republic of China was founded. The
government owned the whole system from all power generation to transmission,
distribution and at last end-user services for many years. The Central Government also
controlled investment allocation, project approval, sitting selection, grid distribution and
tariff setting. All power plants were owned and managed either by the Ministry Of
Electric Power and Water Resources Utilization (MOEPWRU), at the central government
level, and by the Electric Power and Water Resources Utilization Bureaus at the
provincial level, or by other local Agencies. Government functions in the power sector,
such as regulation and taxing, and business management of generation, transmission and
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distribution were combined into the same administrative unit. In 1988 MOEPWRU was
split up in the Ministry Of Electric Power (MOEP) and the Ministry of Water Resources
Utilization (MOWRU). MOEP thereby became the responsible ministry for the power
sector. (Source: EJ.W. van Sambeek, October 2001)
5.2.2 Two phases of ownership reform
5.2.2.1 The first reform
From the mid-1980s to 1990s the situation of the Chmese central government having
complete control of the power sector's ownership and decision making rights was a bit
changed — this was the first time that China reformed its electricity power sector.
The reason and the aim of the reform
Rapid economic and income growth creates a very serious electricity shortage situation in
China. China needs more electricity to construct and develop itself.
The aim of reform is the Chmese government wanted to raise capital and then expand
capacity through the institutional and market reform.
The reform included
Firstly, the central government allowed non-central government investors such as
provincial, local government, domestic and foreign companies to invest in the generation
of the Chinese sub-sector.
Secondly, to encourage investment, the central government reset the tariffs paid to the
power producers which guarantees a 12 - 15% rate of return (Source: Chi Zhang, January
31,2003).
Thirdly, the Chinese government raised the electricity prices, adding RMB 2 cents to the
end-user to raise capital and collect funds for the newly established electricity plants, as
well as to absorb investment from various sources. (Source: ibid)
Fourthly, the central government also began to raise its own investment capital from
financial markets, such as issued bonds.
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Fifthly, from 1988, the government started the institutional separation of government and
business management functions by gradually establishing Regional and Provincial
Electric Power Companies alongside the Regional and Provincial Electric Power Boards.
Although institutional separation was thereby achieved, the functional separation of
resources, responsibilities and personnel in fact lagged dramatically behind. (Source:
ibid)
The result of the reform
The reform encouraged new investors, "the central government financial source declined
from 100% of total capital construction before the reform to 44.6% in the 1990s."
(Source: ibid) The reform significantly increased the ability of national and sub-national
governments and power sector companies to fund their construction. In this aspect, the
reform was successful in financing because the Chinese generation got an unprecedented
capacity expansion. In another aspect of the institutional and market reform, the
government has gradually relinquished its monopolistic control on the generation side of
the sector. "But until 1997, government-run and owned power plants still dominated the
generation market, and the Chinese Government continued to control the transmission,
distribution and retailing of electricity through various government agencies and state-run
corporations." (Based on source: ibid)
5.2.2.2 The second reform
Following the first reform in the mid of 1980s, the second electricity industry reform
began in the late 1990s.
The reason and the aim of the reform
The nationwide electricity shortage changed by the late 1990s due to the capacity
expansion. The new problem emerged — electricity "overproduction"5.
The inefficiency is due to the fact that the Chinese center government monopolizes the
electric grid and electric market. Although the first reform has been carried out to
diversify the ownership in generation sub-sector, separate government power companies
and make them profit-driven, the industry continues to be characterized by the
government dominance in business decision making. The Chinese center government
controls all electric grid and sale prices and also controls the control vertically given to
5
 So called "overproduction", actually is electric power produced and translated unbalanced due to the poor
market function.
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each level of power bureaus. Most of provinces in China have their own power grid, but
Independent Power Producer (IPPs) in China only have the right to generate. This causes
regional protectionism and unequal competition.
The aim of the reform is the general goal of the reform is to promote electricity industry
development and efficiency by breaking up monopoly and reducing the influence of the
government in business decision making and introducing a market mechanism into the
central planning.
The reform included
Institutional reform:
From 1997 to 1998, government functions and business management of MOEP were
separated, the State Power Corporation of China (SPCC) and Ministry of Electricity
Power Industry (MEPI) were established. SPCC was established to run the national
electricity system alongside with MOEP. From then on, the control of electricity sector
assets and business responsibilities will be taken over by SPCC gradually. The same
separation was carried out at each level of governments from provinces down to counties
and municipalities following the separation from the center government.
Market reform:
From 1998 to 2000, according to the published reform plan, the different main tasks
include: (1) reorganizing utility companies: restructure the Provincial Electric Power
Companies (PEPC) to fully owned subsidiaries of SPCC. (2) separating generation and
transmission: PEPCs will create the provincial market and adjust transmission system
operators. (Source: www.sp.com.cn)
Single buyer system:
From 2001 to 2010, national transmission grids will be established. Generation will be
completely separated from transmission and distribution activities, and the single buyer
based on a pool pricing system will operate a competitive generation market. Investment
in generation will be open to all investors. (The details of transmission grids and its
reform will be introduced in the following 5.3 section) (Source: ibid)
Wholesale competition:
After 2010 the competition market among power generators will be promoted to be
compatible with the electricity markets in the world. China will further develop a
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competitive power generation market, and gradually transfer the power market to an
"unbundled" tariff structure6.
The result of reform
The reforms have not yet been laid down in any comprehensive legal act. The Electricity
Law of 1996 provides sufficient scope and mandate to the State Council to carry through
most of the initial reforms in electric sector. However, if the power market moves
towards a competitive market, new pricing mechanisms and sound ownership structures
will be established. That requires adaptations in legislation. There will be more challenge
for China to solve.
From the introduction of Chinese power industry, it is known that the power industry is
the biggest contributor of SO2 pollution in China. Furthermore the Chinese power
industry came through the time of money shortage successfully, the industry grows fast
and its central monopoly has been broken. Nevertheless such a break is still a modal
operation, and it yet needs a long term perspective to achieve the relatively healthy
electricity market and real competition within the market. Anyway, the reform of the
Chinese power sector will create strong benefits to implement ETS in China. This will be
analyzed in the following "Analysis 1".
5.3 Nationwide grids and its reform in China
5.3.1 The background of nationwide grids of China
The first 220kV electricity transmission line was established in 1943 in China. During the
1950s and 1960s, provincial power grids were formed gradually. In 1972, the first 330kV
transmission line was built to establish a cross-provincial power grid — the Northwest
Power Network (NWPN). In 1981 500 kV lines appeared in the Chinese power grid. The
first interconnection project of regional power grids was commissioned in 1989. It was a
DC tie line of +/-500kV, 1200MW line which was designed to transmit hydroelectric
power from Gezhouba Hydroelectric Station (is at Yichang City, 40 km downstream
from the Three Gorges Hydroelectric Station.) to the East China Power Network (ECPN).
6
 Actually, beginning with the economic reform started in 1978, market and competition were slowly
introduced into the national economy. Competition in the electricity industry was particularly late because
it was a vital sector that government needs control it for long time. Although private businesses have been
invited to join in and compete with the public economy, the government maintains that state ownership has
to be dominant in vital industries of the economy to ensure social control (Jiang Zemin, 1997).
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Today the total length of the 500kV lines is 31,394 km, the total length of the 330kV
lines is 8,669 km and the total length of the 220kV lines is 134,875 km by the end of
2002 in the whole country. (Source: Power Grid Interconnections In China 2001-2002,
Xiaoxin Zhou, May 6, 2002) hi the Northwest Power Network the highest voltage level is
330kV, which is different from the other parts of the country. Because of the unbalance
of the energy resources distribution in China, the coalmines are located mostly in the
Northwest and the hydro potential mostly in the Southwest, while the electricity load
centers are in the coastal areas of the East, long distance transmissions are needed.
5.3.2 Grids' interconnection in China and its future plan
Provincial grid: each province has its own independent grid. Operation and management
of these grids is usually coordinated under a Regional Electric Power Bureau that
manages the regional electric grid. However, eight independent provincial grids, (they are
Shandong, Sichuan, Fujian, Chongqing, Hainan, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Guizhou) and
three autonomous regions grids (they are Guangxi, Xinjiang, Tibet) do not fall under a
regional electric grid.
Regional grid: there are 7 regional grids (one region here may include several provinces)
in the mainland of China. They are East China, North China, Northeast China, Central
China, Northwest China, South China, and Sichuan and Chongqing for the inter-
provincial networks, Now the East China Network has been connected with the Central
China Network by the High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) line. It is expected that
among the existing networks more interconnections by High Voltage Alternative Current
(HVAC) or HVDC links will be realized in the future and the nationwide interconnected
grid will cover most existing regional and provincial networks by the year of 2015-2020.
(Source: Xiaoxin Zhou, 2000)
Figure 11 shows us an overview of the regional grid connection in China. The grids
within each province are not described in the figure, the HVAC and HVDC in the figure
only mean the method to connect different regional grids. We can see from the Figure 11,
most of the inter-provincial grids within a region are allocated in the east of China and
center of China.
In order to achieve the connection of grids between all the regions and to meet the
increasing demand of electricity, the Chinese government devotes a huge amount of
energy and financial investment to build grid within the regions and operators between
regions. According to the State Council's power development plans, some key projects
will be finished in 2005, such as a 500kV AC transmission line which connects the North
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China Region with the North-east region and Southern China Interconnected Network.
The following Figure 12 shows that what the grid will be in 2005 in China, if all planned
project are finished.
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From the Figure 12, we can see that the grids within the east and south-east regions will
be more concentrated than in 2002, and the inter-regional grids will be extended from the
coast, from good economic regions to the internal, poor regions. And there are high hopes
that all regional grids will be connected in another two decades. More and better regional
grids mean that more areas are connected together, and it indicates that more power
plants will compete fairly, and the electricity prices in such areas will be balanced. The
benefits to emissions trading in China will be analyzed in the following.
5.4 Analysis
Analysis 1: Why choose power sector to test emissions trading
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the power industry is an uniquely huge SO2
emission contributor. The character of the huge amount of SO2 emission obviously forces
the Chinese power industry to play a very important role when the ETS is tested in China.
Additionally, considering the Figure 6 in chapter II, during the period in which the total
amount of SO2 emission decreased, the SO2 emissions from power industry continually
increased. This means that the control of the SO2 emission from power industry was
unsuccessful. It indicated that the SO2 pollution from power plants cannot be controlled
well through the present command and control policy. The situation forces the
policymakers to find the reason and study a new approach to control SO2 emission from
the power sector. As a method of protecting the environment as well as saving costs for
plants, the emissions trading is chosen to control the pollution from China's power sector.
In addition to the power sector's heavy SO2 pollution and unsuccessful control, the power
industry as a sector is more suitable to implement emissions trading. Comparing the
power sector with other heavy SO2 emission sources, such as vehicles or individual
houses using coal in the rural area, the SO2 emissions from power plants are appropriate
to inspect, calculate and most importantly to trade. For vehicles it is easy to inspect its
emission, but it is impossible for the owners of the vehicles to trade since the individual
source is too small and so many in total; they only way to reduce the SO2 emission from
vehicles is to encourage public traffic or to apply a higher technique for controlling
emission from each vehicle. As to the homes using coal it is impossible to inspect their
emissions or trade since the sources are so many and the cost is too high for them.
Furthermore, the power sector is the biggest state-owned enterprise which is facing a
market reform. The goals of the reform are to make the power sector a separated,
competitive industry. China's reform in power sector means a lot to establishing the ETS
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in China. The reform in ownership may encourage establishing more and more private
electricity companies or groups, and the interference from government will decrease, and
the trading within the power plants may be easier. China's reform in grids will lead to the
separation of the electricity producer and electricity transmission. It will change the
original transmission way — the power plants transmit their electricity to designated
areas, the consumer have to accept it whether the electricity price high or low, and even
whether the electricity is sufficient or not. This means that the grids in China will not be
controlled by power plants, thus the competition between different power plants will be
fairer.
There is an example of Chinese inefficient electricity transmission: Ertan is the largest
hydropower station by now in China. The building of it was started in 1991 and finished
at the late 1990s. The project was built to supply power to Sichuan province. However,
since it was finished, it has only been able to sell two thirds of the contracted power and
at a very low tariff of just above two cents. The reason is that the Ertan project was built
in the time of lacking power, but nine years passed, many IPPs and small electric power
plants have supplied enough power to Sichuan province, and the Ertan project just started
to work at the time of overproduction — a regional overproduction caused by each
province build and control its own electricity system. Since the power plant is not
separated from grids, Ertan couldn't transmit its electricity to other provinces, the result
is that the water saved in Ertan hydro-project cannot be kept there any more, the water
that should be used to generate electricity is now discharged. It creates a huge waste
problem. So efficient transmission is a necessary precondition for an efficient market.
Analysis 2: A idea about using clean energy like natural gas
Although coal is the dominant raw source of power plants, it is better for China to shift its
energy policy from mainly coal use to diversification of energy resources. Not only
because the heavy coal use has damaged the environment but also because that when the
alternative resources are properly used, they are more efficient than using coal. Among
the diverse energy resources, in my opinion, natural gas is a very good substitute resource
because of its high efficient combustion and zero SO2 pollution.
Sometimes using natural gas as a fuel source for electricity generation is more difficult
than using coal, due to the high cost and difficulty of transport of natural gas. Fortunately,
the government is ready to develop natural gas as a fuel of power generation. Beginning
with the 10th Five-year plan and 2010 long-term development guideline, the new policy
turns to stress fuel diversification and optimal energy structure besides traditional energy
security. Accordingly, large hydropower, long-distance transmission, west-east natural
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gas pipeline, distribution networks and gas-fired power plants have been planned for the
10th Five-year period (2001-2005). Moderate nuclear power development has also been
put on the agenda.
If the emissions trading system is to be introduced to China's power sector, the use of
natural gas as the source for power plants should be encouraged. Using natural gas, the
power plants may effective reduce SO2 pollution, so the marginal cost for SO2 emission
reduction is much less than that of the traditional coal-fired power plants, thus the gas-
fired power plants can earn much money by selling its allowance, and the cost of using
natural gas will be reduced accordingly. And the government and policymakers should
consider thoroughly the relative legislation in the power sector at the same time, such as
reforming the nature gas tariffs, the power project approval procedure etc; all these means
together will lead to the use of more natural gas in China's power sector, thus the Chinese
environment will be benefit.
Maybe the current regulation of emissions also provides an incentive to substitute coal by
gas, but by comparing the principle of ETS and the current PLS, it is found that the PLS
is on the basis of polluter pays principle. The force comes from the regulator but not from
market; on the contrary the principle of ETS is to pursue the maximization of interest.
The forces to reduce SO2 pollution for the plants are from both the regulator and the
market interest. So the ETS can help the power sector to adopt the clean resources better.
In general, natural gas is the main competitor to coal because it is an abundant resource in
China, the increasing use of market-based instruments such as ETS in China will make
gas play an important role in power generating system.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the situation of the power sector in China has been introduced, and its
environmental impacts have been analyzed. The introduction of the reform of the Chinese
power industry has focused on the ownership restructure of the power sector and grids-
producers separation. The necessity and possibility of implementing ETS in the Chinese
power sector have been analyzed. Finally, I have pointed out that the establishment of
ETS in the power sector will encourage the use of natural gas as the source for power
plants, and this is important for protection of the environment.
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Chapter VI Design a domestic emissions trading system for
China
For designing the emissions trading system for China, both of the international and extern
experiences should be helpful. In this chapter, the domestic ETS of China is designed
based on the study of US Acid Rain Program and Chinese Taiyuan pilot scheme. Thus,
the designing element is summarized, and designed each by each.
6.1 Pilot projects of emissions trading in China
Using market-based mechanisms as instruments for environmental protection is relatively
new to China. China is experimenting emissions trading to reduce sulphur dioxide
emissions through doing pilots or demonstrations.
Two projects piloting sulphur emissions trading were started. They are being carried out
in two cities in China — Benxi of Liaoning province, Nantong of Jiangsu Province in
2000. After the success of these initial pilot projects, the emissions trading pilot projects
were expanded to four provinces (Jiangsu, Shanxi, Shandong and Henan), three cities
(Tianjin, Shanghai and Liuzhou) and one enterprise (Huaneng Company) in 2002. In
addition, Chinese and American experts are co-operating to implement the pilot projects
of emissions trading in China. In the thesis, Taiyan city is chosen to be studied as an
example due to its relatively complete development among all pilot projects.
6.1.1 Case study: Emissions trading pilot in Taiyuan city
6.1.1.1 Background of Taiyuan city
Taiyuan with the population of 2.7 million and situated about 500 kilometers southwest
of Beijing, it covers about 7,000 square kilometres area and is surrounded by mountains
on three sides. This kind of topography easily traps smoke and air emissions, but Taiyuan
is a coal-rich city, with heavy reliance on the uncontrolled coal combustion as a source of
heat and power. That leads to the heavy SO2 pollution in Taiyuan and the concentration
of SO2 reached more than three times the China's Class II standard. A report by the
World Bank identified that Taiyuan is among the most polluted cities in the world in
1998. (Source: Richard Morgenstern, et al., 2002) So "In Taiyuan, since spring 2001, the
Resources For the Future (RFF) team has been assessing the local situation and, most
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recently, designing a program for emissions trading among large emitters in Taiyuan."
(Source: Resources For the Future, Summer 2002, Issue 148)
6.1.1.2 The framework of emissions trading pilot and its relative policy making in
Taiyuan
Framework of emissions trading pilot in Taiyuan
The environmental policy in Taiyuan follows the central government's policy. It means
that Taiyuan is using PLS to protect the environment and it has the shortcomings of PLS
which has been analyzed in Chapter III. As an emissions trading pilot city, Taiyuan
government issued facility emissions permits (the permits can not be traded) to
companies supervised by SEP A, and then the facility permits allowed to be traded at the
beginning of 2000. The regulations of emissions control in Taiyuan were also relatively
revised to support these series changes. The framework of Taiyuan's emissions trading
pilot is shown in Table 5.
Affected sources
Pilot region
Environmental goals
Allocation method
Legal basis
Trading situations
Monitoring and measurement
Management
Penalty
23 key pollution sources accounting for 50% of total
SO2 emissions
Urban area excluding suburban districts
125,000 tonnes reduction — TEC limits for the Tenth
Five-year Plan, 50% below 2000 level
Historic emissions
Regulation on TEC and SO2 administrative regulation
for SO2 emissions trading in Taiyuan city
Training, trading simulation, and implementation
beginning at Jan. 1, 2003
Continue Emission Monitors (CEMs), periodic sources
monitoring, and material balance
Emission and allowance tracking systems
At least as high as RMB 2,800 (about $ 340)
Table 5 The emissions trading framework in Taiyuan (Based on: Cao, et al., 2002)
Various abatement marginal costs in Taiyuan'splants
One thing worthy to be mentioned here is, in Taiyuan, since spring 2001, the Resources
For the Future team has been assessing the local situation and designing an emissions
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trading program for Taiyuan. The RFF assessed SO2 control costs for different companies
in Taiyuan. Table 6 shows the different abatement marginal costs among the different
companies in Taiyuan.
Control Measure
Treat post-
combustion gas
Lower sulfur coal
(about 1.3%)
Wet method
Add limestone
Full Flue Gas
Desulphurisers
(FGD)
Coal washing
Done
In use
In use
In use
Planned
Planned
Limited use
Applied Place
Taiyuan District Heating
Taiyuan #1 and #2,
Taiyuan Iron and Steel
Taiyuan district heating,
Xishan thermal plant
Coal gasification Plant
(Planned)
Taiyuna #1 and #2
Coking plants
$/ton
60
85
60 - 130
130
150-200
340
Table 6 The marginal cost of SO2 abatement in Taiyuan (Based on: Richard Morgenstern,
summer 2002, and Richard Morgenstern, April 2004)
Table 6 gives us the various methods of reducing SO2 emission, most of them are used by
plants, and others are planned to be used. This situation provides different marginal costs
from different plants, and it is a favorable condition of implementing emissions trading.
The policy making
In general, the 2005 SO2 reduction goal for each source is 50 percent of its 2000 reported
SO2 emissions. A uniform annual reduction is applied to each source from 2001 to 2005.
"If the participating enterprises are the SO2 control point sources in Taiyuan's Tenth
Five-year Plan and their 2005 SO2 emissions specified in the plan already are lower than
50 percent of their 2000 reported emissions, their planned 2005 SO2 reduction goals are
used.
If the sources are listed in the 2001 environmental responsibility contract system, their
2001 contract emissions are adopted as the baseline. A uniform annual reduction is
applied to each source from 2002 to 2005.
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If the sources' SO2 emissions specified in their 2001 environmental responsibility
contracts already are lower than 50 percent of their 2000 reported emissions, their 2005
reduction goals are set at 20 percent below 2001 permitted emissions. Each source is
required to reduce 5 percent of its 2001 permitted SO2 emissions every year, beginning
from 2002." (Based on: ibid)
The result
Although the emissions trading program in Taiyuan is still in the initial stage, the
legislation about ETS is not completed, and no real trading activity has taken place,
Taiyuan's emissions trading demonstration project can be seen as a major milestone, due
to:
• Taiyuan's regulation is notable as the first comprehensive regulation of this kind
in the China to support a cap-and-trade system on a city-wide basis.
• The establishment of an administrative framework to support the regulation;
development and demonstration of various computer-based tools to facilitate
emissions monitoring and verification, and to manage the allowances (Emissions
Tracking and Allowance Tracking System).
• The capacity of building and training in the field of the theory, practice, and
management of emissions trading systems for both government and industry,
including senior officials and technical and managerial staff; and initial simulation
of emissions trading among selected facilities. (Source: Richard Morgenstern,
April, 2004)
6.1.2 Lessons learned
From the emissions trading pilot project in Taiyuan, we can see that, firstly, Taiyuan is a
city with serious SO2 pollution, relatively poor and allocated within SO2 emissions
control zone of TCZs in China, so Taiyuan is a typical city to implement ETS, successful
implementing emissions trading there means a lot to bigger regions such as TCZs and
even whole China. Secondly, there is a wide range of abatement marginal costs (from $60
— $340) among SO2 emitting sources in Taiyuan. Different enterprises have facilities
with different age, technologies, locations; fuel use is another factor leading to different
marginal abatement cost. This kind of situation is the same all over China. According to
the emissions trading principle, sources with low marginal costs can sell their excess
reductions to sources with higher marginal costs. An emissions trading program can help
the participating sources use the lowest cost to achieve the emissions reduction goal since
a wide range in marginal costs exists in China. So the different marginal costs between
different enterprises make the trading feasible. Third, Taiyuan EPBs focused on
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allocating allowances as accurate as possible. Most emissions allowances allocated to
sources are in proportion to historic quotas, "but reserving 10 to 15 percent of the
allocation for new growth". (Source: ibid) Fourth, the emissions trading policy in
Taiyuan address the penalty issue in the regulation. But the set penalty is ambiguously.
The penalty (at least as high as RMB 2,800, about $340) is set according to the highest
abatement cost of SO2. The current highest abatement cost of SO2 is using coal washing;
it is cost $ 340 per tonne. I do not know why the regulator did not fix a clear penalty.
Maybe it is an intractable decision for the regulator due to the fact that the allowances
trading market in Taiyuan is very undeveloped. If the penalty is too high, it may make the
trader feel too frustrated and even quit from the trading. If the penalty is too low, it may
have too little enough incentive to make the trader reduce their emissions. Any way, an
emissions trading system cannot be implemented healthily without an appropriate penalty
level, and the penalty should be fixed.
In general, the pilot emissions trading projects have got some successful fruits, and
compared with the America Acid Rain Program, which was introduced in the previous
chapter, it is not difficult to find that the Chinese emissions trading framework is
modeled from America's. Both of them can provide a model for a more large-scale
emissions trading program in China. The difference is that the American experiences tell
us what we should take into consideration consider when designing an ETS, and the
Chinese experiences tell us how to modify the advanced experiences to address Chinese
own characters without losing the main effects of emissions trading.
6.2 Design element
In developing an emissions trading program, the policymakers should consider a number
of design element. By studying and analyzing the existing emissions trading systems
(such as America Acid Rain Program) and some of articles written by famous
environmental-economic experts (e.g. A. Denny Ellerman, Paul L. Joskow, Richard
Schmalensee, etc), I have summarized some major points that are crucial for designing an
emissions trading system. They are: applicability design, policy design and administrative
design.
The applicability design includes:
• Objective pollution. Choose what kind of pollution from all pollutions is the first
objective to start an emissions trading project. It is more convenient to choose one
kind of pollution at the initial stage.
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• The size of affected area. The decision of the trading area can directly influence
the result of the emissions trading program.
• Participants. Participants of an emissions trading system, in another word is, who
would be involved in emissions trading system, and why?
The policy design includes:
• Set the cap. The cap is often difficult to determine because policymakers always
cannot get the accurate information. The policymakers may analyze the potential
costs and benefits of different caps, and the cap should be set at a level that is
expected to address the environmental and health problems and at an acceptable
cost.
• Allocation of permits. The policymakers may analyze the effects of different
allocation options for emission sources, and then decide a method for distributing
allowances.
• Phase in. Timing the period of phase of implementing emissions trading.
• Banking. Policymakers should decide whether pollution sources be allowed to
save allowances for using in the future years.
• Connecting ETS with the China's existing Pollution Levy System. It will be
excellent if the ETS and PLS can work together, the problem is, can they be
compatible each other, and how to design ETS to achieve that.
The administrative design includes:
• Measuring the emission. Emissions trading system needs the regulators assure
that the emission's quality and quantity are right, so provide an equal foundation
to trader to compete.
• Registry. All emitting sources, the amounts and kinds of their emissions,
transfers, permit prices, dates and amounts of transactions and expiration of
unused permits are recorded. Transparency of these accurate data will ensure the
good function and credibility of an emissions trading system.
59
• Information system and transparency. The transparency and emissions trading
information should be available to share at any time. Another step in acquiring
transparency is to publish all the data concerning emissions and transaction on
websites or annual reports (Tietenberg et al., 1998).
• Penalty. Penalty is set to restrain the sources to break the allowance amount, and
thus, the cap of total emissions amount is assured.
Generally, I classified these conditions in order to help comparison and connection with
Chinese situation, assist in designing a Chinese emissions trading system.
6.3 Designing an emissions trading system for China
Before designing a suitable emissions trading system for China, some questions besides
the design element will be analyzed, discussed and stated here. The evidence for
analyzing, discussing and answering the questions are taken from the previous chapters.
Some of the analyses have been partly referred in the previous chapters, and they will be
fully analyzed and organized here to demonstrate how to design a suitable ETS for China.
6.3.1 Why is the SO2 emission considered to be reduced?
By researching China's air pollution problems, I have given evidence that the SO2
emission occupies the biggest part of all air pollution in China, and I have pointed the
harm of SO2 emissions: it can be transferred to acid rain and the effect on the plants, the
crops, the water and living lives. Thereby the SO2 emission causes the loss of a huge
amount of money, the economic loss is almost as big as 3% of China's GDP increase. So
the SO2 emission is identified as the most serious air pollution problem in China, and the
Chinese government has devoted lots of energy and recourses in order to reduce the SO2
emission.
6.3.2 Why adopt emissions trading as an instrument to reduce SO2 emission in
China?
From the study of China's environmental policy — PLS, it's found that the reformed PLS
is better than the primary PLS and addresses some key problems contained in the primary
PLS. But it still cannot meet the balance of environment and pollution sources. For
example, the new pollution levy cannot be accepted by the pollution sources of China.
The direct reason of refusing a high levy rate by sources is that the sources are afraid of a
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higher levy rate and reject to pay the high levy; the indirect reason is, in fact, that the
command and control policy, which the existing PLS is based on, does not provide a fair
competitive environment, and blocks the possibility of reducing pollution. The command
and control policy fixes all the requirement of regulators, includes the emissions standard,
control technology, and measurement, etc. Thus it limits the sources in their reduction of
emissions according to their own characters. So the required methods to reduce emissions
are often not the best to the sources.
Compared to PLS, the emissions trading instrument strongly suggests using market
solutions to address environmental problems. Under the emissions trading system,
sources with higher marginal abatement costs can buy allowances from sources with
lower marginal abatement costs to achieve the emissions reductions required for the
higher-cost sources. This is very important since the higher-cost sources benefit by
saving money and lower-cost sources benefit by earning money, and the environmental
regulators benefits by simpler and more efficient implementation, so both the high
abatement marginal cost sources and low abatement marginal cost sources and the
regulators would like to use the emissions trading system, and the environment will be
protected without any compromise.
6.3.3 Why choose the power sector to experience emissions trading first in China?
The choice of the power sector to embark the emissions trading in China is not based
only on the fact that China's power sector is the largest single contributor to SO2
pollution, but is also based on the unsuccessful control of SO2 emission in China's power
sector. The SO2 emissions from the power sector in China are over one-third of China's
total SO2 emissions, and during the 1990s the government was very devoted to the
control of SO2 in China. The SO2 emissions from other sources have been reduced except
for the power sector. The heavy SO2 pollution and the bigoted increasing situation forces
China to improve the existing policy to control SO2 emission in the power sector. In
addition, the reform of China's power sector gradually provides a better environment for
implementing emissions trading, and furthermore, applying emissions trading in China's
power sector can promote the power sector's reform. Finally, comparing the power sector
with other sources with serious SO2 pollution, for example vehicles in China, the SO2
emission from the power sector is easer to calculate and measure in each power plant
than in the individual vehicle.
6.3.4 Why choose cap and trade?
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Typically, there are three forms of emissions trading programs — cap and trade, baseline
and credit, and offset. Which one is better for China's emissions trading system?
Comparing these models, the definition of the baseline and credit may produce conflicts
between the government and the participating sources, because the base level could be
defined according to historical emissions, or emissions of a particular source or sector.
Besides, the administrative burden increases compared to the cap and trade, since each
source or each sector may have its own baseline which needs to be verified and approved
by the government. (Source: Dimitrios Mavrakis, 2003) Comparing baseline and credits
to offset, you find that the majority of the implemented and designed ETS are cap and
trade programs. A Cap and trade program sets a ceiling to the total emission, it takes care
of the capability of the environment to resist the emissions and it complies with the core
policy in China's revised environmental law — total Emissions Control. So a cap and
trade program will be more acceptable for the Chinese government and SO2 emission
resources.
6.3.5 Why and how to use American cap and trade program experiences?
The United States is the only country which is most successful in emissions trading, and
the most successful case of using the cap and trade program is the Acid Rain program.
American experiences on emissions trading are China's important references, and
American experts have started the cooperation with the Chinese government and
environmental experts, and from it you can see how deep the American Acid Rain
Program's experiences will influence China's cap and trade program. Just like the cap
and trade program designed in this thesis, it is following the framework of the American
emissions trading program. But the US is not China at all. They are very different in
many aspects, the designer should not copy America's program to China without change.
The most obvious difference between China and America is the economy. That includes
the different economic level and the economic market. The average economic level of
China now is much lower than that of America, and even that of America in the 1970s.
The affected sources in China's cap and trade program are not rich enough to apply the
same standard as America, especially on technology, such as clean production technology
or monitoring technology. In addition, China's electricity market is very undeveloped. So
it is very important to cope with the problem of how to implement an ETS without a
sufficient free-market. The ETS in China must flexibly absorb American experiences
and combine them with the Chinese market, the political and economic characters. The
ETS must achieve the aim of reducing SO2 pollution, must be efficiently implemented
and accepted by entities.
6.3.6 Design a domestic emissions trading system for China
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6.3.6.1 The applicability design
The target pollution
The SO2 emission in China is the target pollution in the emissions trading program. SO2
emission in China has been introduced in the previous chapter and analyzed at the
beginning of this chapter.
Trading areas
Trading areas should be better decided on a cap and trade program according to the
maximal covering of the SO2 pollution by the regulator. It means that the trading area is
better the bigger. For example, when the companies in area A emit SO2 into the air, the
emission will not only pollute the surrounding environment, but also, according to the
property of SO2, it can affect the area B hundreds and even thousands of kilometers
away. It is very rare the emission only affects the area where a source is located. The
most normal scenario is that the wind changes direction often, and it is often seen that
area A pollutes area B, and area B can also pollute area A. So, when there is no certain
information about what happens to emissions from particular sources, or when the policy
goal is a general reduction of SO2, the broad scope of trading includes both areas, and it
is a better idea that the permits issued in areas A and B are equally valid when presented
for compliance in either area. In the case of China, Two Control Zones are a suitable area
to test the emissions trading program, due to the fact that the TCZs emit over 50% of the
SO2 emission of China's total SO2 emission. Thus the emissions trading program
includes a significant portion of the total SO2 emissions in China, and the program will
achieve its environmental protection goal.
Participants
In the initial stage of implementing the emissions trading program it is important to avoid
too many participants. Choosing the main, large polluting power plants and excluding
some small power plants may help the regulator to achieve an efficient operation. So,
when designing the ETS for China, the large power plants, for example, "annual SO2
emissions greater than 5,000 tonnes" (Source: Jintian Yang, March 2003) can be included
to start the emissions trading program in TCZs.
6.3.6.2 The policy design
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Setting the cap
Setting a cap for the ETS is the most important thing in designing the system. I would
like to use the American Acid Rain Program for my reference because the initial principle
to allocate permits to emitting sources is easier in the U.S. Acid Rain Program. The way
to decide the cap in the Acid Rain Program can be simply described as following:
"The emission rate (which was based on estimates of the emission rate that could be
attained by the best available control technology in the early 1970s. And the emission
rate was 1.2 pounds of SO2 per million Btu of heat input, around 137 grams per
kilocalorie) multiplied by average annual fuel use during a three-year, historic baseline
(1985-87)." (Source: A. Denny Ellerman, 2003) "The aggregate amount of emissions
allowed by this standard was approximately 9 million tons, which was approximately half
of 1980 emissions. It is believed a level that was sufficient to meet the environmental
objective from acid rain." (Based on: A. Denny Ellerman, 2003)
I cannot get the data of Chinese regional SO2 emission amounts, and neither that of the
Chinese firms. I do not know China's emission rate, and I cannot calculate the cap of SO2
emissions trading myself. Fortunately, I can find some material to be used as an alternate
data for Chinese ETS:
Since 2000, Total Emissions Control is the newest and the most important element of
Chinese environmental policy. It can be seen as the pilot project for the emissions trading
scheme in China. Specifically including SO2, it places a ceiling on total emissions for
twelve major pollutants. The TEC provides a target like a cap, although it is not a real cap
in emissions trading project, it still provides a measure for judging the effectiveness of
control measures.
The aim of national total emission control for SO2 emission was decided in the Ninth
Five-year Plan (1996 — 2000). The cap of SO2 emission each year is 24.5 million ton
(Based on: Wu Zuefang, et al, 2000) — the same as 1995 SO2 pollution level. The cap
was allocated among 31 regions — subordinate levels of government. In the Tenth Five-
year Plan (2001 — 2005), the cap was reduced further. The government decided the cap
of 18 million tons (approximately 10% lower than the 2000 level), and distributed it to
regions of China. (Source: China emission trading http://www.cet.net.cn)
According to the information above, the cap of Chinese ETS could be set as 18 million
tons in the Tenth Five-year Plan, 10% below the level of 2000. And according to SEPA's
report about China's TCZs, the SO2 emissions from TCZs is about 50% of total SO2
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emission in China, and the SO2 emission from coal-fired power plants accounts for 50%
of SO2 emission in TCZs (Source: Liu Zi, Nov. 2002). Thus, the cap of the power plants
in TCZs will be 18 million multiplying by 50%, and multiplying by 50% again is equal to
4.5 million tones.
Allocating the permits
Issuing allowances is a big challenge for EPBs. EPBs are in charge of deciding how
many allowances to issue to each affected source within their jurisdictions. The allocation
must ensure that the local EPBs issue the allowances fair to firms, and the sum of local
permits must be equal to the cap of nation.
From studying emissions trading programs in US I know that there are two methods to
allocate permits to companies: auction (sources are required to bid for the number of
allowances they would like to purchase) or grandfathering — give permits away for free.
The free allowances are welcomed by affected sources, and the auction can create income
for the government. So, should China allocate allowances free to plants or by auction?
Figure 13 will help to demonstrate the question.
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Figure 13 Sketch map about allowances allocation (Source: A. Denny Ellerman, 2003)
In Figure 13, Eo is the assumption that a company can discharge SO2 as much as it can
without any control about it, so its corresponding abatement cost is zero; and "0" in the
horizontal axis is the assumption that the company can control all emission without any
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pollution discharge, so its corresponding marginal abatement cost is the highest— 100. If
the regulator issues a cap of E*, so the total cost of the company to reduce the emission
from Eo to E* is area A. Apparently, if the regulator issues the allowances E* freely, this
means that the area A is the only cost for the company to reduce the emission from Eo to
E*; if the regulator issues the allowances by auction, it means that the government "sells"
the allowances to the company with the price t*, so the cost for the company to reduce
the emission from Eoto E* is the sum of area A and area B.
In my opinion the question is: the regulator earns the money of area B but loses the
plant's positivity or loses the money of area B but wins more plants to join in the
emissions trading program, which one is better? My answer is, that in the initial stage of
China's emissions trading program, the Chinese government should focus on
encouraging sources to join in the program, but not ask too much from the plants.
Sources' positivity should be taken care of, thereby the sources can cooperate with the
government's policy pleasantly.
Phase in
The phase of the implementing period should be linked to the environmental problem and
reflect the operational situations. If the environmental problem is a continuous and long-
term pollution, such as SO2 emission and acid rain, the implementing period should be
continuous.
The phase of China's emissions trading program must be compatible with the Chinese
Five-year Plan. For example in the program started from 2001 this phase will finish at
2005. During the next five years the cap of the emissions trading program will be
adjusted according to the previous five years' implementing situation.
The Taiyuan city's emissions trading pilot can provide some experiences about timing the
phase to the regulator. In Taiyuan's policy it states, "in general, the 2005 SO2 reduction
goal for each source is 50 percent of its 2000 reported SO2 emissions. A uniform annual
reduction is to be applied to each source from 2001 to 2005". That means the object of
the phase is to reduce 50% of 2000 SO2 emission and to ensure that the SO2 reduce stably
and to achieve the abatement goal at the end of 2005, the regulator required each source
reduce 10% of SO2 emission each year. This can be used to decide the phase of the
designing program. For example, in the first five-year (2006 - 2010), the large power
plants in TCZs are required to reduce SO2 emission of 20% lower than the 2000 level. It
can be designed for each power plant to reduce 4% uniformly from 2006 to 2010. From
the implementing situation each year the policymaker can find out if the cap is
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appropriate, and adjust it from the next phase or even from the next compliance year, if
the cap is too ambitious or too low.
The long-term plan of China's emissions trading program is:
Phase one: from 2006 to 2010, the first one third of most polluted power plants in the
TCZs start emissions trading program;
Phase two: from 2010 to 2015, the emissions trading program will be expand to all power
plants in the TCZs;
Phase three: after 2015, the emissions trading program will be expanded to all power
plants in the whole country.
As analyzed above, in each phase the allowances can be issued by a uniformed reduction
in each year, and in each following phase the cap of SO2 emission will be set more
strictly, until the total amount of China's SO2 emission arrives an optimal level.
Banking
The American experience of the Acid Rain Program has demonstrated that the banking is
a very helpful way when implementing emissions trading. The merit of banking is, firstly,
the SO2 emission can be reduced earlier, because the sources want to save the permits to
be used in next year; secondly, the banking can be used to avoid undue volatility in
allowance prices.
The banking is especially meaningful in China. Because China is a developing country
with heavy SO2 pollution, so reducing the SO2 emission earlier will benefit China's
environment.
So in China's ETS, policymakers should better allow sources to use allowances in one
period for compliance in subsequent periods, it may make the ETS more flexible and
efficient. The period may be decided as one year.
Connecting ETS with the China's existing Pollution Levy System
When designing emissions trading system for China, how can the policymakers ignore
the existing environmental instrument — PLS. PLS is the most completed environmental
policy until now in China. Its reform in 2000 makes the levy system goes further toward
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the balance of environmental protection and economic development. The main merit of
the PLS except for reducing emission is, collecting charging fees to raise revenue,
thereby support the local EPBs. However, technically, the levy system now using high
levy to change the polluting behavior of the sources duplicates the emissions trading
system. So, does the ETS have to substitute the existing PLS, or can they supplement
each other? Figure 14 will help us to analyze the question.
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Marginal Abatement Cost schedule
Figure 14 Connecting ETS with PLS in China (Source: ibid)
Figure 14 shows us that a PLS is add on an ETS. The ETS is in charge of reducing
emissions to below a cap. The PLS imposes a relative low levy t' in the figure, and it is
carrying the role of collecting fees.
The low levy t' will lead to a small amount of abatement Eo - E\ the total cost of
abatement from Eoto E' is the area Al, and the levies paid to the government is Bl + B2.
Of cause, this low levy cannot make the sources to emit the pollution to a satisfied level,
assumed E*. In order to achieve the assumed reduction of the emission Eo - E*, in the
PLS, the levy should be set as me, and the cost for the source is A1+A2+B1+B2+C. This
is too expensive for the sources although some money may be returned to the sources by
the local EPBs. So, the sources will not accept this high level, thus the goal of the
reduction of emission will not be achieved. Now let us see what will happen when the
ETS joins in (and the allowance from E* to zero is allocated free), the emission reduces
from Eg to E*, the sources just need to pay B2 more to be the levy to support the EPBs
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except for paying the abatement cost Al + A2 + Bl, but they still save the cost of the
area C. Therefore when the PLS is add on the ETS, the sources may accept the cost, and
the goal of reduction of pollution will be achieved.
From the analyzing of Figure 14, we can see that the affected sources do not have to pay
too much levy, just B2 to support the EPBs, and on the other hand, the levy system can
protect the environmental "baseline" if the ETS is out of control under some special
situation.
6.3.6.3 The administrative design
Measure the emissions
The emissions trading program needs plants to provide accurate emission amounts.
Principally, there are various approaches to measure the emissions from the plants. The
most reliable method is the use of Continuous Emission Monitors (CEMs) system. But
the CEM system is very expensive. For example the cost of buying a basic NOx/02 CEM
system, including sample probe, analyzers, and enclosure, is $29,000-50,000, and it is
much less than in the past. (Source: J.C. Smith)
In American Acid Rain Program most of the power plants are required to install CEM
system. For small power plants the EPA allows the use of an alternative method to
measure emission, and the method is called material balance calculations. It is the way of
by estimating the amount of coal burned or the output of the facility, thus the total
emission can be calculated. The EPBs will require these information that allows it to
determine total emissions and that can be used to determine compliance in an emissions
trading system.
Considering the situation of the Chinese power plants, most of them will find it very hard
to afford the expensive CEM system. Since the method of material balance calculations
can provide enough accurate parameters (Source: A. Deny Allerman, 2003), China's
existing power plants should be allowed to use alternative ways such as material balance
calculations to measure emissions. But the new-built, expanded and transformed power
plants in TCZs have to be required to install CEM system. Thus more and more power
plants will install the CEM system and the measure process will become more accurate
and easier.
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Registry
The emissions trading program needs a registry of permits recording the compliance in a
trading program. Since the permits deducted from a particular source need not to be the
same as those issued initially to it, some means must be used to track the permits from the
time they are issued until the time they are withdrawn from the system for compliance,
and to ensure that the permits are not used twice.
China's emissions trading system should have such a registry system to track the progress
of issuing permits and see to it that the permits are not reused by sources. The registry
creates an account for each emitting source, into which permits are initially deposited by
the regulatory authority and subsequently deducted in an amount equal to the emissions
at the end of each compliance period. Since no actual certificates are issued to sources,
the permits can be readily transferred from one account to another account. Typically,
permits are assigned serial numbers to be easy to track.
Information system and transparency
All participants need to know the detailed information about the permits, trading amount,
price, etc. of everybody else. Thus they can make the right decision to sale or buy the
permits, and how many permits to trade. So, beside the registry system, China's ETS
needs an information system that includes data collecting, review and management,
provides a transparent information network for all participants.
The American information system has two modules — the Emissions Tracking Module
(ETM) and Allowance Tracking Module (ATM). The purpose of the ETM is to collect,
review the emission-related data from each source. The purpose of ATM is accounting
for the trading program, keeping track of account information. Both of them are public,
so the traders can share the information.
From the experiences of Taiyuan's emissions trading project, Taiyuan city has set the
ETM and ATM. It demonstrated that setting a computer-based tool to ensure emissions
monitoring and to manage the allowances is not difficult for Taiyuan, and it will not be a
problem for the TCZs.
Penalty
The emissions trading system in China should have a fix penalty to force the sources not
to break the limit of the total amounts of emission issued to them. Simply, a very strict
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and high penalty can prohibit the sources from emitting pollution over the cap of
allowances. In the American Acid Rain Program the regulator fines the penalty over ten
times the highest market price, so no rational source wants to pay such high penalty.
Thereby, they have to control their emissions under the specified level no matter how
they achieve that. The negative aspect of a too high penalty is that it may have the effect
that the sources cannot afford the penalty, and influence or even ruin the trading process.
If using a low penalty, for example, a penalty price is a bit higher, 1.5 to 2 times the
highest marginal cost within the affected sources. This can achieve the aim of penalty,
because the fine that the breaker pays is always higher than the breaker's marginal cost.
There is another problem; the cap of the program is a fixed cap for emissions. If the
penalty is too low, such as mentioned above, using 1.5 to 2 times the highest abatement
marginal cost among the sources, it may be easy for sources to pay the penalty, thus, the
cap will be exceeded, and it will reduce their incentive to trade. So, considering the
standing ability of each source and the incentive of the market, it is appropriate in China
to set the penalty a bit higher than 2 times — 3 times the highest abatement marginal cost
(around $1000) is fine.
6.4 Conclusion
Conclusively, the emissions trading pilot project in Taiyuan have been introduced in this
chapter. The case of Taiyuan has been analyzed and some lessons have been learned from
this case. Different design element have been classified and analyzed. A series of
questions related to the emissions trading have been discussed and answered. Finally an
emissions trading system for China has been designed based on the Chinese
environmental, economic and policy background. In the designing, setting the cap, the
allocation of allowances, measurement of emission and combining ETS with the existing
PLS have been emphasized in the designing progress.
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Chapter VII The feasibility of implementing emissions trading
in China
In order to assess if the designed emissions trading system is feasible for China a number
of environmental, economic, technological, institutional and legal questions need to be
analyzed and discussed.
7.1 Will China's emissions trading system appropriately address
China's SO2 problem?
China's SO2 emission problem has three features 1) heavy pollution, 2) trans-boundary
and 3) the Chinese power industry is the unique biggest source of SO2 emission in China.
Firstly, the Chinese SO2 pollution has deeply influenced Chinese people's health and
Chinese economic development as well as badly damaging the environment of neighbour
countries such as Korea and Japan. Both national and international pressure is urging the
Chinese government to solve this problem. By using the cap and trade policy to control
SO2 emission in China and fixing a ceiling so that the total amount of SO2 emission is
controlled under the ceiling, the cap and trade program has managed to address China's
heavy SO2 pollution situation. Secondly, the acid rain and SO2 pollution problem in
China is transregional in nature. Therefore, the use of a market-based instrument, like the
emissions trading which allows some flexibility where emissions occur, is an appropriate
policy tool. In the American experience, emissions trading programs are most effective
when they address emission reduction over a large geographic area. In the third place, the
power industry is the biggest contributor of SO2 emissions in China. The designed ETS
for China that is embarked from power industry is just for reduction of SO2 pollution
from the key sector. So, by using the instrument of emissions trading China's SO2
problem can appropriately addressed.
7.2 Are there enough sources and do they have different abatement
costs?
The cap and trade program should include enough sources to provide an active market for
the sources to trade. If only a few participants are included in the trading program, the
sources may feel that they have too few opportunities of trading. In China, as mentioned
in Chapter II, there are 500,000 sets of coal burning equipment working. This causes
18,000 kilo tons SO2 emission every year which accounts for 90% of the total emission of
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SC»2. There are about 3,000 power plants. In accordance with the introduction of China's
Two Control Zones in chapter III, the TCZs include 50% of China's total SO2 emissions
trading, and over 50% of the SO2 emissions are from power plants. Although I cannot get
an accurate number of how many power plants are located in TCZs from the above data,
we can see that there must be more power plants in the TCZs than in phase I of the
American Acid Rain Program.
In addition, the cap and trade program makes most sense when the emission sources have
different costs for reducing emissions (Source: Newell and Stavins, 1997). Even if there
are thousands of power plants joining in the emissions trading program, it doesn't work
without various abatement costs among the plants (for example, the plants use same clean
coal technology to reduce SO2 emissions). From the case study of emissions trading pilot
programme in Taiyuan we know that there is a big range of abatement marginal costs
(from $ 60 per tonne to $340 per tonne). It is the same situation all over China. An
emissions trading program can help to find the minimum cost approach for the
participating sources since a wide range of marginal costs exists in China. And with the
technology developing, the difference in abatement marginal cost may be widened. This
is a crucial evidence in demonstrating that emissions trading is feasible in China.
7.3 Is the measurement accurate enough?
Unlike many other environmental regulations, the cap and trade program needs accurate
data from sources, so that the regulator can clearly know if the sources finish their task
and how many permits they should buy or sell. In the American Acid Rain Program, most
of the power plants installed CEMs and only some small power plants' emissions are
measured by material balance calculations. On the other hand, in China most of the
power plants will use material balance calculation to measure their emissions; only some
large power plants can install CEMs. That is due to China's low economic level and the
poor situation of the Chinese power plants, hi my opinion, in the first place the material
balance is a good method to measure the emissions. If used in China as it is being used
by small power plants in US, it is an acceptable way and it can provide solid data
although it is not as accurate as CEMs. In the second place, if most of the power plants
use the method of material balance calculations, and if the checking process is equitable,
the checking results can be seen as correct and valuable data. So, although the material
balance calculation is not the best, it is accurate enough to be an alternative method of
CEMs in the Chinese emissions trading program. Of cause, when the new built, expanded
and transformed power plants in China are required to install CEMs, more and more
power plants can provide better quality data in the future.
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7.4 Is The ETS compatible with the existing environmental policy?
The existing environmental policy in China is Pollution Levy System. It is not only the
most basic instrument for meeting environmental goals so far, but also it provides
funding for the EPBs. Substituting China's PLS with emissions trading system may raise
practical problems. The ETS in China designed in the chapter VI is as a primary policy
for achieving environmental goals, and the PLS may be supplementary to ETS. Their
responsibility is clear: ETS for controlling total amount of emissions not over the cap,
and PLS for charging the levy to support the EPBs. They are not in conflict with each
other in principle, and they will not conflict each other during implementation.
7.5 Is the market free enough to implement emissions trading in China?
All the emissions trading program must be based on the principle of the free market
mechanism to ensure the possibility of enterprises' trading action. Neither buying nor
selling can be done properly in a sector with only one supplier. Because if no enterprise
has independent ownership and no one has private interests, there will be no market
competition.
Thinking about the market, the Chinese economic reform has to be mentioned. China's
economic restructuring started from rural areas. In 1979, the first pilot project was started
in some villages of the provinces Anhui and Sichuan. On the basis of these first,
successful experiences, the restructuring was introduced to the cities gradually; China's
opening-up strategy was also piloted in its coastal provinces and later introduced to the
less well-off hinterland. The control of grain price was first loosened in 1979, when the
government fixed the prices of nearly all commodities and labor costs. The government
has been deregulating the prices of most commodities since 1985. The number of
categories of non-government-priced commodities was increased from 89 to 737 in 1992.
(Source: China Daily November 12, 2002)
The ratio of non-state economies and state economies is an important mark of the
country's economic structure. China's economic reform has changed Chinese socialist
economy into a socialist-market economy. In 2002 "non-state economies account for
more than 40 percent of the country's GDP, while the state-run economy holds a leading
position in some key sectors including energy, transportation, telecommunications, the
arms industry and high-tech sector." (Source: ibid).
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Overview of China's economic reform, the getting a free market has been a great and
profitable achievement and the Chinese government is developing China's economy
towards a more matured and freer market.
In the case of China's power industry, although it has experienced drastic change in
recent years, it still has a long way to go to become a real private enterprise. China's
power industry hardly reforms because of its history and important function in China's
economy and security.
At present, most of the discussion focuses on the monopoly of the Chinese power
industry and the reform of the power systems such as electricity grids. The point is, that
speeding the privatization of Chinese power industry and introducing free electric market
are urgent tasks in China.
Yes, the power plants do need more private investments to break the monopoly of the
government and a freer market with equal competition. But in my opinion, the
privatization of power industry and the building of a free electric market are the last aims
that China wants to achieve, but not yet. The first thing that the Chinese power sector
needs to do is to promote production efficiency. Although breaking ownership and grids
monopoly in principle may stimulate the efficiency of the power sector, they are not very
practical in the near future. This is due to the poor situation of the grids — Chinese grids
have not enough capacity, further separating grids may create more technological
problems; the character of natural monopoly of grids exists even in the least monopolized
country, the US, the power crisis also appeared there, actually no country in the world
can really break the monopoly of power industry.
In China's current situation, the government's supervision and lead of the power industry
and power market seem more important. So, privatization in the Chinese power industry
is the necessary condition to achieve free electric market, but this condition can be
fulfilled only when China's grids have enough capacity.
According to the experience of China's successful economic reform, it is reasonable to
believe that China's electric power sector can successfully complete the last step —
deeply institutional restructuring, separating of the government regulation function from
the business operation, freeing the electricity price and achieving the competitive market.
But there must be a problem of timing. According to the plan of the Chinese industry
sector, the first class generation level and formal electricity market in China may be
formed around 2010, the SO2 emission may not be traded in real meaning until then. The
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pilots of emissions trading in China can be used to collect experiences of implementing
the trade and the regulations.
In general, China's power industry still has a long way to go to achieve the aim of the
free market; the emissions trading can be implemented under the government's
supervision, but it cannot reach its full capacity due to the undeveloped market. Anyway,
the trend is that the Chinese market will be freer; the power companies will gradually be
allowed more and more free trade within the market.
7.6 Is there adequate legal authority in China?
Since China has never been a mature law-based society, so does a legal authority exist for
emissions trading in China, and if the enforcement is strong and independent enough are
the key challenges for implementing emissions trading in China.
In China the laws are legislated by NPC and the regulations. The administrative
department makes the related methods for implementation of the laws. In the case of
China's emissions trading program the law about using the emissions trading instrument
to reduce China's SO2 emission should be added in China's Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Law. The newly amended CAPPCL just includes the TEC policy and requires
local governments within the TCZs to check and approve total emissions from sources
and issue emission permits according to the procedures that the State Council has
stipulated, taking into consideration the principles of openness, fairness, and justice.
(Source: Jintian Yang and Jeremy Scheifels, March 2003). The permits mentioned above
are a kind of facility permits; they cannot be traded among the companies. The facility
permits can be seen as the foundation of trying out tradable permits in China. So the
current CAPPCL does not contain the national emissions trading program. The States
Council issues the method of using emissions trading to reduce SO2 emissions, and the
SEPA is in charge of the design of ETS in China and issues all regulations that an ETS
requires. Obviously, without the provision in CAPPCL the emissions trading program
seriously lacks a legal basis. But China's historic experience suggests that regulation
from the government, such as SEPA, means a lot of legal support; and the ETS, TCZs
and the facility permits have demonstrated that China's environmental law is legislating
towards the use of emissions trading to achieve the ambitious environmental goal. In
general, the legal authority does not yet exist, but it is reasonable to believe that China's
emissions trading pilot projects have a high priority in the law making process, and it will
be included in the revised CAPPCL in the near future.
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The lack of independent and strong enforcement is a big obstacle to the implementation
of the emissions trading program in China. Some articles claims that China's
enforcement of compliance is weak and even more important: legislation and
administration are mixed together. (Source: Ruth Greenspan Bell, 2003). Their point is
that the legislation, administration and judicature should be clearly separated avoid the
corruption as much as possible. In the case of the American Acid Rain Program the
independent enforcement authority effectively implemented its task, such as measuring
emissions and fining penalties. Comparing to China's emissions trading program, the
regulators implemented a regulation that they, themselves have decided. This may lead to
a situation in which the regulators are not seriously working in favor of implementing the
regulation, or they may change the regulations frequently according to their own ideas. If
they make mistakes, they will not be held responsible in court. All these problems may
seriously influence the implementation of emissions trading program in China in a
negative way.
But looking into the ETS in China, things are not so bad. The emissions trading program
is designed to embark from the power sector in China. Fortunately, the power sector is
gradually being separated and is no longer under the control of the central government. If
the power sector totally belongs to the central government, the power plants' interests are
strongly related to the government's interest. After private investors have built more and
more power plants, the government's protection of the power sector will decrease. So the
situation has changed from the condition that the government tries to protect the power
sector by deviating the regulations, not withstanding they made the regulations
themselves, to the condition that the government administrates the power sector
according to the regulations.
Apparently, the power sector's restructure makes the emissions trading program's
implementation possible, but the problem of lack of enough enforcement is still existing.
On this condition the government's volition plays a very important role. When the
government emphasizes a project, for example the emissions trading program, the
government will especially strengthen the administration on the program, the stronger the
government's volition is, the more careful and obedient the regulators are. This creates
good conditions for the emissions trading program. Using emissions trading to reduce
China's SO2 pollution is and will be supported in the highest level in China. "Xie
Zhenhua, Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA),
highlighted Total Emission Control as the key to successful emissions trading, and spoke
of the need to treat emissions as a "resource". He also noted that emissions trading is
widely accepted because it solves more environmental problems with fewer costs, adding
that China will implement an emissions trading policy after current pilot programs are
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successfully concluded." (Source: US embassy report, May 2003) We can claim that the
enforcement of China's emissions trading program is strong and guaranteed.
In general, this section discussed the disadvantage of Chinese legislative authority, and
then discussed that Chinese government's volition can help the disadvantage, thereby
explained why the emissions trading can be implemented under the existing legislative
authority. So, the section is talking about that if the Chinese legislative authority is still
weak (like now), the ETS can still be implemented in such condition, although the quality
will be somehow influenced.
To prove that I have confidence in the successful reform of Chinese power sector, the
current results from the reform within the power sector is not enough. The reform in other
fields may help the reader to understand the Chinese economic reform, thereby to
understand from another angle why I trust the reform of the Chinese power sector. The
Chinese government forcing China joins in World Trade Organization (WTO) is a good
example. Most of the international and internal opinions are that China will certainly join
the WTO sooner or later with China's fast increase of GDP. But the Chinese government
had multi-sides negotiations to join in the WTO constantly for more than ten years, even
made large compromises, and China finally participated in WTO in 2001. The reason is
that the Chinese government has realized that the local protectionism and bureaucratism
block the deepening reform of the economy more seriously, and that it cannot solve these
problems alone inside China. The Chinese government has to rely on the international
pressure to break these obstacles. Joining in the WTO impacts the Chinese economy a lot.
The agriculture will suffer because of its low efficiency. The Chinese insurance industry
that is just at the beginning stage, will have to compete with foreign developed insurance
companies. Many state-owned enterprises face bankruptcy because of their poor
management, and the Chinese financial system will meet serious challenges, if foreign
banks come into China. The Chinese government acknowledged these risks, but still
chose to join the WTO to break the monopoly (both local and country) and deepen the
reform at a huge cost. The strong volition of the Chinese government and the process of
Chinese the economic reform makes me convinced that the reform of the Chinese power
sector will succeed.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed the conditions that China needs to successfully implement
emissions trading. I have tried to throw a light on whether China can meet with the
requirements and how far China has come in this process. I have discussed the problem
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of the ability of China's emissions trading system to appropriately address the SO2
pollution problem, the problem of ample enough sources and different abatement costs,
the problem of accurate measurements, the question whether the ETS is compatible with
the existing environmental policy and whether the market is free enough to implement
emission trading in China. Finally the problem of adequate legal authority in China was
dealt with. The Chinese conditions of the market and the legal authority for the
emissions trading program have been emphasized. According to the my analysis, the
emissions trading system is considered to be feasible, in spite of the fact that the market
is not totally free and in spite of the fact that the Chinese society still lacks in legal
regulation.
It is my conviction that the emissions trading system can be brought to function - even if
the conditions are not perfect. Because of China's rapid development the ETS is going to
be feasible for China.
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Chapter VIII Conclusions
With the fast economic growth being maintained, the by-product of it, environmental
degradation is getting seriously in China. Among all environmental problems in China, to
control the SO2 emission is chosen to be the main objective. In this thesis, I tried to find a
way to control SO2 pollution more effectively and efficiently in China, and to
demonstrate that the chosen way is feasible in China.
At the beginning of the thesis the Chinese energy consumption and the air pollution
caused by the energy consumption are introduced. The trend of Chinese energy
consumption, the resulting air pollution and the meanings of controlling SO2 form power
sector are analysed: coal is still the dominant resource to meet the fast developing
economy in china. The SO2 emissions from burning coal are and will continue to be a
serious issue for a long time, and the coal-fired power plants are the single, largest source
of SO2 emissions in China. The main result of SO2 emissions is acid rain, which badly
influences the environment, the living standard, and results in a huge economic loss. As a
result of the Chinese government's concern of the SO2 pollution problem since 1990s, the
total SO2 emissions decreased in a short period, but there is still a strong trend of
increasing SO2 emissions. This is caused by the power industry.
To understand how China protects its environment, China's legislative and administrative
situations about environmental protection are introduced. The role of the Chinese
Communist Party in legislature and government has been analyzed. Compared to the
former PLS, the three new environmental policies — reformed PLS, TCZs and TEC have
been introduced and analyzed. By analyzing the legislation and the implementation of the
policies and the characters of the reformed PLS, the remaining problems in Chinese
environmental legislative and administrative institution have been pointed out; and the
problem is narrowing down to the discussion of the trial of the emissions trading system
in China. Furthermore, the reasons why China's PLS should be changed to a market-
based instrument have been explained.
The concept of emissions trading and how it works and reduces costs are introduced in
the thesis. By comparing the ETS with the existing command and control and PLS in
China, the conclusion is drawn that the ETS is better than the present PLS in China, and
the ETS should be adopted by the Chinese government to control the SO2 emission.
80
China's power industry is chosen as the sector to practice ETS first. Therefore, the
situation of the power sector and its environmental impacts in China has been introduced.
The introduction of the reform of the Chinese power industry has focused on the
ownership restructure of the power sector and grids-producers separation. The necessity
and possibility of implementing ETS in the Chinese power sector have been analyzed.
And also, I have pointed out that the establishment of ETS in the power sector will
encourage the use of natural gas as the source for power plants, this is important for
protection of the environment.
Before designing the ETS for China, the America's Acid Rain Program as a successful
case and emissions trading pilot project in Taiyuan as a case to learn important national
experiences have been analyzed carefully. Different design element have been classified
and analyzed. A series of questions related to the emissions trading have been discussed
and answered. In the designing, an emissions trading system for China has been designed
based on the Chinese environmental, economic and policy background.
After designing the domestic emissions trading system, I have analyzed the conditions
that China needs to successfully implement it. I have tried to discuss whether China can
meet with the requirements and how far China has come in this process. I have discussed
the problem of the ability of China's emissions trading system to appropriately address
the SO2 pollution problem, the problem of ample enough sources and different abatement
costs, the problem of accurate measurements, the question whether the ETS is compatible
with the existing environmental policy, whether the market is free enough to implement
emission trading in China and the problem of adequate legal authority in China was dealt
with. The Chinese conditions of the market and the legal authority for the emissions
trading program have been emphasized. According to the my analysis, the emissions
trading system is considered to be feasible, in spite of the fact that the market is not
totally free and in spite of the fact that the Chinese society still lacks in legal regulation.
Finally, most of the successful SO2 emissions trading schemes have been only
implemented in developed countries. This indicates that it may be a big challenge for the
Chinese government and policy makers to implement the ETS since China lacks high
economic level and free markets. I have conviction that the emissions trading system can
be brought to function because of China's rapid development - even if the conditions are
not perfect now.
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Appendix I Power plants in China (1000 MW and above)
Principal coal-fired and Nuclear Power Plants in Operation (1000 MW and above)
as of December 31,2000
NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Name of Power
Plant
Zouxian
Shalingzi
Shajiao C
Beilun II
Suizhong
Harbin No.3
Jianbi
Douhe
Yuanbaoshan
Huaneng
Luohuang
Taizou
Huaneng
Location
(Province,
Municipality
or
Autonomous
Region)
Shandong
Hebei
Guangdong
Zhejiang
Liaoning
Heilongjiang
Jiangsu
Hebei
Inner
Mongolia
Sichuan
Zhejiang
Liaoning
Plant
capacity
(MW)
2400
2100
1980
1800
1600
1600
1600
1550
1500
1440
1410
1400
Unit
capacity
and
numbers
(MWxNo.s)
300x4
600x2
300x7
660x3
600x3
800x2
200x2
600x2
100x3
300x4
125x2
250x2
200x4
300 x 1
600 x 1
600 x 1
360x4
125x6
300x2
350x4
Steam
Pressure
(Mpa)
17.0
18.4
17.0
17.1
17.0
24.0
13.0
17.0
9.0
16.5
13.0
17.0
13.0
18.1
18.1
17.1
17.3
13.0
17.0
16.9
Steam
Temperature
(°C)
555/555
541/541
537/537
540/540
537/537
540/540
535/535
537/537
535
550/550
538/538
538/538
535/535
540/540
540/540
537/537
538/538
535/535
537/537
538/538
Fuel
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
87
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Dalian
Ligang
Huaneng
Nantong
Huaneng
Fuzhou
Jingyuan
Dalate
Huaneng
Shang'an
Xuzhou
Dagang
Jiaozuo
Xingtai
ShentouNo.l
Taiyuan No. 1
Shiliquan
Shuangliao
Xibaipo
Datong No.2
Yangquan No.2
Fengzhen
Qinghe
Jinzhou
Tieling
Fularji No.2
Jiangsu
Jiangsu
Fujian
Gansu
Inner
Mongolia
Hebei
Jiangsu
Tianjin
Henan
Hebei
Shanxi
Shanxi
Shandong
Jilin
Hebei
Shanxi
Shanxi
Inner
Mongolia
Liaoning
Liaoning
Liaoning
Heilongjiang
1400
1400
1400
1400
1320
1300
1300
1280
1260
1255
1250
1250
1225
1212
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
350x4
350x4
350x4
200x4
300x2
330x4
350x2
300x2
125x4
200x4
320x4
200x6
200x6
200x2
200x4
300x4
125x5
300x2
300x4
300x4
200x6
300x4
200x6
100x4
200x4
200x6
300x4
200x6
16.9
16.9
16.9
13.0
17.0
16.9
16.9
17.0
13.5
13.0
16.9
13.0
13.0
13.0
16.5
17.0
13.5
17.0
17.0
17.0
13.0
17.0
13.0
9.0
13.0
13.0
17.0
13.0
538/538
538/538
538/538
537/537
537/537
538/538
540/540
537/537
550/550
535/535
538/538
535/535
535/535
540/540
530/530
537/537
550/550
540/540
537/537
537/537
535/535
537/537
535/535
535
535/535
535/535
537/537
535/535
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal,Oil
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal,Oil
Coal
Coal
Coal
88
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Shidongkou
Shidongkou
No.2
Waigaoqiao
Changshu
Wangting
Yangzhou No.2
Beilun I
Pingwei
Luohe
Huaneng
Dezhou
Shiheng
Weihe
Daba
Hanchuan
Yangluo
Xiangfan
Fengcheng
ShajiaoA
Zhujiang
Mawang
Zhanjiang
Baogang
Yaomeng
Huangpu
Zhenghai
Qinling
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Jiangsu
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Anhui
Shandong
Shandong
Shaanxi
Ningxia
Hubei
Hubei
Hubei
Jiangxi
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Shanghai
Henan
Guangdong
Zhejiang
Shaanxi
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200
1199.7
1170
1100
1050
1050
300x4
600x2
300x4
300x4
300x4
600x2
600x2
600x2
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
300x4
200x3
300x2
300x4
300x4
400x3
350x3
270 x 1
300 x 1
300x2
125x4
300x2
125x2
200x4
125x2
16.5
24.6
17.0
17.0
16.5
17.1
17.0
17.0
16.5
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
13.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
17.0
16.9
16.5
16.5
18.1
13.0
16.5
13.0
13.0
13.0
535/535
547/547
537/537
537/537
550/550
540/540
537/537
537/537
550/550
537/537
538/538
535/535
537/537
537/537
537/537
537/537
537/537
535/535
537/537
537/537
537/537
537/537
538/538
550/550
550/550
540/540
550/550
535/535
550/550
535/535
550/550
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal,Oil
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal,Oil
Coal,Oil
Coal
89
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Zhangze
Mudanjiang
No.2
Shouyangshan
Junliangcheng
Jixian(Panshan)
Qinhuangdao
Matou
Shentou No.2
Yimin
Longkou
Shanxi
Heilongjiang
Hebei
Tianjin
Tianjin
Hebei
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner
Mongolia
Shandong
1040
1020
1020
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
200x4
100x2
210x4
100x4
210x2
200 x 1
210x2
300x2
200x4
500x2
200x2
300x2
200x4
500x2
500x2
100x2
200x4
13.0
9.0
13.0
9.0
13.0
13.0
13.0
17.0
13.0
24.0
13.0
17.0
13.0
16.9
24.0
9.0
13.0
535/535
535
535/535
535
535/536
535/535
535/535
537/537
535/535
540/540
535/535
537/537
535/535
535/535
540/540
535
535/535
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
Nuclear Power Plant that is been on operation
71
Daya Bay
Nuclear Power
Plant
Guangdong 1800 900 x2 PWR Nuclear
Notes: Taiwan Province, H.K., Macao are not included.
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Large Hydropower Stations in Operation (1000 MW and above) as of December 31,
2000
NO
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Name
Ertan
Gezhouba
Guangzhou
Pumped
Storage
Tianhuangping
Pumped
Storage
Lijiaxia
Baishan
Shuikou
Tianshengqiao
Liujiaxia
Longyangxia
Manwan
Yantan
Wuqiangxi
Geheyan
Tianshengqiao
Wanjiazai
Fengman
River
Yalongjiang
Changjiang
Tributary of
Liuxi River
Yellow River
Songhuajiang
Minjiang
Nanpanjiang
Yellow River
Yellow River
Lancangjiang
Hongshuihe
Yuanshui
Qingjiang
Nanpanjiang
Yellow River
Songhuajiang
Location (Province,
Municipality or
Autonomous Region)
Sichuan
Hubei
Guangdong
Zhejiang
Qinghai
Jilin
Fujian
Guizhou/Guangxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Yunnan
Guangxi
Hunan
Hubei
Guizhou/Guangxi
Inner
Mongonia/Shanxi
Jilin
Installed
capacity
550x6
170x2
125x19
300x8
300x6
400x4
300x5
200x7
220x6
225x1
255x2
260x1
320x1
320x4
250x5
302.5x4
240 x 5
300x4
300x4
180x6
1002.5
(Source: www.sp.com.cn)
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Appendix II Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention
and Control of Atmospheric Pollution
(adopted on August 29, 1995)
(amended on April 29, 2000)
Chapter I General Provisions
Article 1 This Law is formulated for the purpose of preventing and controlling
atmospheric pollution, protecting and improving people's environment and the ecological
environment, safeguarding human health, and promoting the sustainable development of
economy and society.
Article 2 The State Council and the local people's governments at various levels must
incorporate the protection of the atmospheric environment into their national economic
and social development plans, make rational plans for the distribution of industrial layout,
strengthen the scientific research on the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution,
adopt preventive and curative measures against atmospheric pollution, and protect and
improve the atmospheric environment.
Article 3 The State takes measures to control or gradually reduce, in a planned way, the
total amount of the main atmospheric pollutants discharged in local areas.
The local people's governments at various levels shall be responsible for the quality of
the atmospheric environment under their own jurisdictions, making plans and taking
measures to make the quality of the atmospheric environment under their own
jurisdictions meet the prescribed standard.
Article 4 The administrative department of environmental protections under the people's
governments at or above the county level shall be the instrument conducting unified
supervision and management of the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution.
The administrative departments of public security, transportation, railways and fishery at
various levels shall, by performing their respective functions, conduct supervision and
management of the atmospheric pollution caused by motor-driven vehicles and vessels.
The relevant administrative departments under the people's governments at or above the
county level shall, within their respective functions, supervise and administer the
prevention and control of atmospheric pollution.
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Article 5 All units and individuals shall have the obligation to protect the atmospheric
environment and shall have the right to report on or file charges against units or
individuals that cause pollution to the atmospheric environment.
Article 6 The administrative department of environmental protection under the State
Council shall establish national standards for atmospheric environment quality.
The people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly
under the Central Government may establish their local standards for items not specified
in the national standards for atmospheric environment quality and report the same to the
administrative department of environmental protection under the State Council for the
record.
Article 7 The administrative department of environmental protection under the State
Council shall, in accordance with the national standards for atmospheric environment
quality and the country's economic and technological conditions, establish national
standards for the discharge of atmospheric pollutants.
The people's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under the Central Government may establish their local discharge standards for
those not specified in the national standards for the discharge of atmospheric pollutants.
With regard to those already specified in the national standards for the discharge of
atmospheric pollutants, they may set local standards which are more stringent than the
national standards and report the standards to the administrative department of
environmental protection under the State Council for record.
Where the local standards for the discharge of atmospheric pollutants by motor-driven
vehicles and vessels established by the people's governments of provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government are more stringent than
the national discharge standards, they shall be subject to the approval of the State
Council.
Units that discharge atmospheric pollutants in areas where the local discharge standards
have been established shall observe such local standards.
Article 8 The State adopts economic and technological policies and measures to facilitate
the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution and comprehensive utilization.
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The people's governments at various levels shall reward units or individuals that have
made outstanding achievements in the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution or
in the protection and improvement of the atmospheric environment.
Article 9 The State encourages and supports the scientific and technological research into
the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution, disseminates advanced, feasible
technologies for the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution; encourages and
supports the development and utilization of clean energies such as solar energy, wind
energy and water energy.
The State encourages and supports the development of environmental protection
industries.
Article 10 The people's governments at various levels shall redouble their efforts in
afforestation, grass-planting, urban and rural greening, and take effective measures to do
well the work of prevention and control of sand so as to improve the atmospheric
environment.
Chapter II Supervision and Management of the Prevention and Control of
Atmospheric Pollution
Article 11 New construction projects, expansion or reconstruction projects which
discharge atmospheric pollutants shall be governed by the State regulations concerning
environmental protection for such projects.
An environmental impact statement on construction projects shall include an assessment
of the atmospheric pollution the project is likely to produce and its impact on the
ecosystem, stipulate the preventive and curative measures. The statement shall be
submitted, according to the specified procedure, to the administrative department of
environmental protection concerned for examination and approval.
When a construction project is to be put into operation or to use, its facilities for the
prevention of atmospheric pollution must be checked and accepted by the administrative
department of environmental protection. Construction projects that do not fulfill the
requirements specified in the State regulations concerning environmental protection for
such construction projects shall not be permitted to begin operation or to use.
Article 12 Units that discharge atmospheric pollutants must, pursuant to the provisions of
the administrative department of environmental protection under the State Council, report
to the local administrative department of environmental protection its existing discharge
and treatment facilities for pollutants and the categories, quantities and concentrations of
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pollutants discharged under normal operation conditions and submit to the same
department relevant technical data concerning the prevention and control of atmospheric
pollution.
Units that discharge pollutants as specified in the preceding paragraph shall report in due
time about any substantial change in the category, quantity or concentration of the
atmospheric pollutants discharged. Their atmospheric pollutant treatment facilities must
ensure normal operations. Where the said facilities are to be dismantled or left idle,
approval of the local administrative department of environmental protection under the
people's government above the county level shall be obtained in advance.
Article 13 Where atmospheric pollutants are discharged, the concentration of the said
pollutants may not exceed the standards prescribed by the State and local authorities.
Article 14 The State implements a system of collecting fees for discharging pollutants on
the basis of the categories and quantities of the atmospheric pollutants discharged, and
establishing reasonable standards for collecting the fees therefor according to the needs of
strengthening prevention and control of atmospheric pollution and the State's economic
and technological conditions.
The standards provided by the State shall be observed in the collection of fees for
discharge of pollutants, the concrete measures therefor and. State Council shall enact the
implementing procedures
The fees collected for discharge of pollutants shall all be turned over to the Treasury and
shall be used for the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution as prescribed by the
State Council and may not be misappropriated. The auditing authorities shall exercise
supervision through auditing according to law.
Article 15 With regard to the regions not meeting the prescribed standards for the quality
of atmospheric environment and the acid rain control areas and the sulfur dioxide
pollution control areas designated as such with the approval of the State Council, the
State Council or the people's government of provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities directly under the Central Government may delimit them as the major
areas for the total emission control air pollutants. The concrete measures for the State
Council shall prescribe the total emission control of major air pollutants.
The local people's government concerned in the areas for the control of total emission of
air pollutants shall check and approve the total emission of major air pollutants by
enterprises and institutions and issue them licenses for emission of major air pollutants. It
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shall do this in accordance with the conditions and procedures provided by the State
Council and in line with the principles of openness, fairness and impartiality.
The enterprises and institutions obliged to control their total emission of air pollutants
must emit their pollutants according to the checked and approved standards for the total
emission of major air pollutants and the conditions of emission provided by the license.
Article 16 No industrial production facilities that cause environmental pollution shall be
built within scenic spots or places of historical interest, natural reserves, areas close to
historical or cultural sites under protection and other places that need special protection,
as designated by the State Council or the people's government of provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government. Other facilities to be
built in these areas must not emit air pollutants in access of the prescribed standards for
pollutant discharge. Enterprises and institutions which built before the enforcement of
this Law, with facilities discharging more pollutants than permitted by the prescribed
discharge standards shall be ordered to dealt with within a period of time in accordance
with the provisions of Article 48 of this Law.
Article 17 The State Council shall, in accordance with the general plan for urban
development, the target of the environment protection plan and the quality of the urban
atmospheric environment, designate some cities as key cities for the control of air
pollution.
Municipalities directly under the Central Government, provincial capitals, coastal open
cities and key tourist cities shall be designated as key cities for the control of air
pollution.
Where key cities for the control of air pollution do not meet the standards for the quality
of the atmospheric environment, they shall endeavor to meet such standards within the
time limit prescribed by the State Council or the administrative department of
environmental protection under the State Council. The people's government of such a
city shall make plans to meet the standards within the time limit, and may, in line with
the authorization or relevant regulations of the State Council, adopt even more stringent
measures to realize such plans.
Article 18 The administrative department of environmental protection under the State
Council together with relevant departments under the State Council may, in light of the
meteorological, topographical, soil and other natural conditions, delimit the areas where
acid rain has occurred or will probably occur and areas that are seriously polluted by
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sulfur dioxide as acid rain control areas and sulfur dioxide pollution control areas with
the approval the State Council.
Article 19 Enterprises shall give priority to the adoption of clean production techniques
that are instrumental to high efficient use of energy and to reducing the discharge of
pollutants so as to decrease the generation of atmospheric pollutants.
The State shall eliminate backward production techniques and equipment that seriously
pollutes the atmospheric environment.
The competent department for comprehensive economic and trade affairs under the State
Council, in conjunction with other relevant departments under the State Council, shall
publish a catalog of the techniques which seriously pollute the atmospheric environment
ones that shall be prohibited from use within a time limit. It shall also catalog the
equipment which seriously pollutes the atmospheric environment and which shall be
prohibited from production, sale, import and use within a time limit.
Producers, sellers, importers or users shall stop the production, sale, importation or use of
the equipment listed in the catalog as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. This must be
done within the time limit prescribed by the competent department for comprehensive
economic and trade affairs under the State Council in conjunction with the relevant
departments under the State Council. People who utilizes the production techniques listed
in the catalog as mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall, within the time limit
prescribed by the competent department for comprehensive economic affairs under the
State Council in conjunction with the relevant departments under the State Council, stop
the use of such techniques.
The equipment eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the preceding two
paragraphs may not be transferred to another for use.
Article 20 Any unit that, as a result of an accident or any other exigency, discharges or
leaks toxic or harmful gases or radioactive substances, thereby causing or threatening to
cause an accident of atmospheric pollution and jeopardize human health, must promptly
take emergency measures to prevent and control the atmospheric pollution hazards, make
the situation known to such units and inhabitants as are likely to be endangered by the
atmospheric pollution hazards, report the situation to the local administrative department
of environmental protection and accept its investigation and settlement.
Under the emergency of a severe atmospheric pollution that may jeopardize human health
and safety, the local people's government shall announce the situation to the local
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residents without delay and take compulsory emergency measures, including ordering the
pollutant discharging units concerned to stop the discharge of pollutants.
Article 21 The administrative department of environmental protection and other
supervisory and administrative departments shall be empowered to make on-site
inspections of units under their jurisdiction that discharge pollutants. The units being
inspected must truthfully report the situation to them and provide them with the necessary
information. The inspecting authorities shall have the obligation to keep confidential the
technological know-how and business secrets of the units inspected.
Article 22 The administrative department of environmental protection under the State
Council shall set up a monitoring system for atmospheric pollution, organize a
monitoring network and work out unified monitoring measures.
Article 23 The administrative department of environmental protection under the people's
governments of large and medium-sized cities shall regularly publish reports on the
quality of the atmospheric environment and gradually introduce the system of forecasting
the quality of atmospheric environment.
A report on the quality of the atmospheric environment shall include such contents as the
characteristics of urban atmospheric pollution, the types of major pollutants and the
extent of harm caused by the pollution.
Chapter III Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution by the Burning of
Coal
Article 24 The State promotes the method of dressing coal by washing for the purpose of
reducing the sulfur and ash in coal, and restricts the mining of high-sulfur or high-ash
coal. If the coal mined from a newly-built coal mine is of high-sulfur or high-ash,
supporting facilities for the dressing of coal by washing shall be installed to make the
sulfur and ash in coal fall within the prescribed limits.
If the coal mined from an established coal mine is of high-sulfur or high-ash, supporting
facilities for the dressing of coal by washing shall be installed within a time limit in
accordance with the plan approved by the State Council.
It is prohibited to mine the coal with toxic or harmful substances, such as radioactive and
arsenic, that exceed the prescribed limits.
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Article 25 The relevant departments under the State Council and the local people's
governments at various levels shall adopt measures to improve the urban energy structure
and popularize the production and utilization of clean energy.
The people's governments of the key cities for the control of air pollution may, within the
regions under their respective jurisdictions, designate areas as those prohibited from
producing and consuming seriously polluting fuels prescribed by the administrative
department of environmental protection under the State Council. The units and
individuals within such areas shall stop consuming such seriously polluting fuels within
the time limit prescribed by the local people's government and shall instead consume
natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, electricity or other clean energy.
Article 26 The State adopts economic and technical policies and measures conducive to
the clean utilization of coal, encourages and supports the consumption of fine coal of
low-sulfur or low-ash, and encourages and supports the development and popularization
of the technology of coal cleaning.
Article 27 The competent department concerned under the State Council shall, pursuant
to the standards for boiler discharge of atmospheric pollutants prescribed by the state,
stipulate corresponding requirements in the boiler quality standards; boilers that do not
meet the prescribed requirements shall not be permitted to be manufactured, sold or
imported.
Article 28 Urban construction shall be conducted on the basis of over-all planning. In
areas with coal heating, unified provision of heat sources shall be practiced and central
heating system shall be developed. In areas covered by central heating pipelines or
networks, no new coal heating boilers may be installed.
Article 29 People's governments of large or medium-sized cities shall make plans for
catering service enterprises to start the use of clean energy such as natural gas, liquefied
petroleum gas and electricity within a prescribed time limit.
Other users of domestic cooking ranges in urban areas of large or medium-sized cities not
designated as areas prohibited from the consumption of coal shall use sulfur-fixed
briquette of coal as fuel or other clean energy. They shall do so within a prescribed time
limit so as to gradually eliminate the direct use of raw coal as fuel.
Article 30 Where any newly built or expanded thermal power plants and other large or
medium-sized enterprise that discharge sulfur dioxide more than the prescribed standards
for pollutants discharge or the quota of total control allow, supporting facilities for
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desulphurization and dust removal must be installed or other measures for controlling the
discharge of sulfur dioxide or for dust removal must be adopted.
In the acid rain control areas or sulfur dioxide pollution control areas, if an existing
enterprise discharges atmospheric pollutants more than the standards for pollutants
discharge allow, the discharge of atmospheric pollutants of the enterprise shall be
controlled within a time limit. This will be in accordance with the provisions of Article
48 of this Law.
The State encourages enterprises to adopt advanced technology for desulphurization and
dust removal.
Enterprises shall gradually adopt measures to control the nitrogen oxide generated by the
burning of fuel.
Article 31 When coal, gangue, coal cinder, coal ashes, sandstone, lime soil or other
materials is stored in densely inhabited areas, fire and dust prevention measures must be
taken in order to prevent atmospheric pollution.
Chapter IV Prevention and Control of Pollutants Discharge by Motor-driven
Vehicles and Vessels
Article 32 Motor-driven vehicles and vessels shall not be permitted to discharge
atmospheric pollutants in excess of the prescribed discharge standards.
No unit or individual may manufacture, sell or import motor-driven vehicles and vessels
that discharge atmospheric pollutants in excess of the prescribed discharge standards.
Article 33 Where motor vehicles currently in use do no meet the standards for pollutants
discharge by motor vehicles at the time they are manufactured, they may not be driven on
the road.
If the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly
under the Central Government prescribe new standards for pollutants discharge by active
motor vehicles and technically transform them, it shall be subject to the approval by the
State Council.
Motor-vehicle repair units shall, in accordance with the requirements for prevention and
control of atmospheric pollution and relevant national technical regulations, carry out
repairs to make the motor-vehicles meet the prescribed standards for pollutants discharge.
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Article 34 The State encourages the production and consumption of motor-driven
vehicles and vessels which use clean energy.
The State encourages and supports the production and consumption of superior fuel oil,
and takes measures to reduce the pollution of atmospheric environment by harmful
substances in the fuel oil. Units and individuals shall, according to the time limit
prescribed by the State Council, stop the production, import and marketing of leaded
gasoline.
Article 35 The administrative departments of environmental protection under the
people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly
under the Central
Government may authorize the annual testing of pollution by motor-vehicle's exhaust
fume in accordance with the relevant regulations. The Central Government may authorize
the units undertaking annual test of motor-vehicles whose qualifications have been
recognized by the public security authorities to conduct these tests.
The departments of communications, fishery and other competent authorities with
supervisory and administrative power may authorize the units undertaking annual test of
motor-vessels whose qualifications have been recognized by the relevant authorities to
conduct annual test of pollution by motor-vessel's exhaust fume in accordance with the
relevant regulations.
The administrative departments of environmental protection under the local people's
governments at or above the county level may conduct supervisory pick-test of the
pollutants discharge by active motor-vehicles at their place of parking.
(Source: http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34422.htm)
101
